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PUBLIC -PRIVATE-PUBLIC
CONVERGENCE: HOW THE PRIVATE
ACTOR CAN SHAPE PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
"'Private Law' is an oxymoron."'
INTRODUCTION
International law, like domestic law, does not operate in a
vacuum.2 As the interdependence of peoples, markets, and
systems intensifies, international law must necessarily adapt
to the new and changing relationships which result. While
domestic law is arguably prepared, through its legislative and
constitutional governance, to recognize these new relation-
ships, the perception and practice of international law faces
fundamental change.3 While this interdependence presents a
challenge, it also offers many opportunities to both the global
community of States and, more than ever before, to the in-
creasingly global community of private actors. This Note ex-
plores one aspect of the challenge presented in addressing the
potential impact of normative market actions on the formation
of customary international law.
While international law has long recognized the relation-
ship between the States' legal convictions and their correlating
actions in the formation of customary international law, cus-
tomary law's formation has remained exclusively an interstate
dynamic. The private actor's impact on such governmental
1. Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA.
J. INTL ECON. L. 33, 34 (1996).
2. See G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1
(1993) (observing that "[ilt is well accepted that one of the most important fea-
tures of an effective legal system is its capacity to reflect the changing needs and
demands of a society in which it operates").
3. As one commentator observes:
Sovereignty, the preoccupation of classical public international law, has
meant having the authority to control actors and activities within the
sovereign's own territory. Yet today, sovereigns cannot control what their
national actors do outside their territory, nor how those activities directly
affect their territory. From this perspective, the reach of the state has
contracted before the market.
Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 607, 613-14 (1995).
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conviction and action has been contained in the political dy-
namic, as shaped by internal State governance. Yet, as inter-
national private and public law "converge"4 to accommodate
evolving interdependence, it is argued that there is a "rebound
convergence "5 found in the relation between private legal ac-
tion and governmental legal response which must be acknowl-
edged.
Traditionally, the private actor's role has been seen as
reactive; scholars, practitioners, and governments have focused
mainly on the impact of international law upon the private
actor. This Note seeks instead to analyze the converse: the
impact of the private actor upon international law. The stance
taken is not purely theoretical: the private actor's impact on
international law is seen as a reality and it is the acknowl-
edgement and legal accommodation of that impact by both
governments and the private actor which are encouraged.
Further, a conscious and active partnership (as opposed to an
ad hoc response and reaction) is sought between private actors
and governments on the international plane-a partnership in
which the private actor actively embraces its role in interna-
tional law formation and in which governments accommodate
that role when it benefits all.s
4. The term "converge," used in this paper to describe the blurring of tra-
ditional boundaries in international law formation and application, is borrowed
from Ronald Brand of the University of Pittsburgh. See Ronald A. Brand, Semantic
Distinctions in an Age of Legal Convergence, 17 U. PA. J. RI' ECON. L. 3, 3
(1996).
5. This term acknowledges that, except in certain contractual relationships,
horizontal relations between private parties and States will likely remain more or
less anomalous due to the scope and nature of State power. The relation examined
here is one of impact, and can be visualized in the cause and effect of a bouncing
ball as it rebounds among surfaces placed at different levels in a given universe.
A similar dynamic lies in the concept of "subsidiarity," in which rationales and
goals are formulated at the individual level, and then are filtered upward as "each
individual enters successively higher levels of social organization to achieve his or
her goals more effectively than is possible alone, or at lower levels of organiza-
tion." Trachtman, supra note 1, at 50 n.40. Subsidiarity is more vertical in nature,
however, and can be captured with terms such as the "domino" or "ripple" effect.
This paper examines a more symbiotic relation, with the impact of action and law
flowing reciprocally, that is, in both (or, more aptly, many) directions.
6. In exploring changing global relations due to current widespread political
and technological changes, James Rosenau examines the "shifts in the loci of au-
thority" which result from subnational interdependencies, as well as concurrent
factionalism, and the impact of these shifts on sovereign authority and centralized
government action. James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World
Politics, in JAMES N. ROSENAU & ERNST-OrTo CZEMPIEL, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
292 [Vol. =XIV:
1998] PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PUBLIC CONVERGENCE
This Note examines the convergence and the rebound
convergence' formed by private legal action and public legal
accommodation. Its focus will be on the interaction between
current State-created labor standards in the "public" interna-
tional arena with global market implementation of those stan-
dards in the "private" arena. Ultimately, this Note will extend
its analysis, to examine the effect of State action accommodat-
ing such "private" market implementation on the formation of
customary international law.
After examining the current role of private actors within
international law in Part I, this Note will narrow its analysis
in Part II, examining the implications of a recent initiative in
the U.S. apparel and footwear industries. The initiative calls
for those industries to compel certain wage and working condi-
tions standards in their foreign operations and sourcing. In
exploring the impetus for the initiative, Part III will survey the
labor standards historical treatment within public internation-
al law, pointing to the gap between interstate aspiration and
sovereign practice. Part IV will then maintain that the gap
between international standards and domestic practice can and
should be filled by a private market initiative. By creating and
enforcing contractual obligations that substantiate internation-
al labor standards, global industry revokes its role as an iso-
lated market beneficiary, directly addressing its emerging
accountability to both the consumers it serves and the govern-
ments that regulate it. Part V then scrutinizes the potential
impact of such a cohesive industry initiative, foreseeing State
accommodation of the market-implemented labor standard
through national legislation. Finally, Part VI examines the
effect of that legislation, in conjunction with market practice,
GOVERNMENT. ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 3 (1992). This Note starts
with the concept of "governance without government-of regulatory mechanisms in
a sphere of activity which function effectively even though they are not endowed
with formal authority." Id. at 5. This Note goes on to focus on the "aggregation of
individual decisions ... serv[ing] immediate subsystem concerns" which "cumulate
to system-wide orderly arrangements." Id. at 5. This Note encourages an order
deriving "from activities that are self-consciously designed to maintain [that] or-
der," id. at 6, and continues by examining the symbiotic relation between informal
governance and formal government which can serve to transform the informal
prerogatives of private actors into formal imperatives of national governments.
Finally, this Note examines how these national imperatives are then authoritative-
ly acknowledged and enacted within the international order.
7. See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.
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on the formation of customary international law.
I. THE PRIVATE ACTOR IN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
The current restructuring of national borders and political
systems,' the opening up of global markets,9 and the recogni-
tion of both economic ° and environmental" interdependence
have naturally led to the reexamination of international law's
traditional constructs.' The constructs which have in the past
so solidly upheld the international legal order are proving
inadequate. 3 There are many arguments calling for shifts in
legal perspectives, for new mechanisms of State cooperation,
for innovative private legal relations, and for the basic proposi-
8. "[Ihe end of the cold war is going to require ultimately that we reassess
policy both domestically and internationally in a far more profound way and in a
far more extensive and pervasive way than I think any of us realized at the
time." Bowman Cutter, U.S. Assistant Deputy for Economic Policy, Address at the
Meeting of the American Bar Association International Law Section (Apr. 30, 1993)
(transcript on file with author).
9. For example, the economies represented in the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration forum expanded between five and eight percent in 1993. Chinas economy
alone has shown double-digit growth in the past few years. See Peter S. Watson,
The Framework for the New Trade Agenda, 25 LAW & POLy INTIL BUS. 1237,
1239-40 (1994).
10. One U.S. official has acknowledged that, as the global trade agenda be-
comes one that deals with "the real kind of integrating effects that the globaliza-
tion of the world economy is having," one issue faced is the harmonization of
"various kinds of situations and legal regimes that have been quite different in
the past and may not have mattered very much." Bowman Cutter, U.S. Assistant
Deputy for Economic Policy, Foreign Press Center Briefing 11 (Dec. 23, 1993)
(transcript available from Federal News Service).
, 11. One commentator has questioned the ability of current mechanisms to
address the growing global awareness of environmental interdependence and effect.
Watson, supra note 9, at 1244 (acknowledging that 'It]here is a real question as
to whether we can begin addressing the new policy issues [such as environmental
protection] through the principles and techniques of the old trade regime.").
12. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at xiii-xiv. A classic statement of the tradi-
tional construct is found in the S.S. "Lotus" case:
International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as ex-
pressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the rela-
tions between these co-existing independent communities or with a view
to the achievement of common aims.
S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7).
13. "The global changes in security, politics, and most fundamentally, econom-
ics and trade since the beginning of the Uruguay Round have created a new con-
struct that requires a serious examination of not only evolving precepts, but in-
deed new realities." Watson, supra note 9, at 1237.
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tion that international law is only barely keeping up with
global reality.14
If international law is lagging behind global reality, how-
ever, it is not for want of trying. In recent years there has been
a proliferation of multilateral efforts to meet global changes,
addressing trade and economic issues, and common concerns
regarding the environment and social considerations. 5
These efforts have not been without success. Pervasive to
each, however, is the dilemma of how to effectively accommo-
date new and varied interests within traditional constructs
which have historically either ignored those interests or have
at least separated them from, and subordinated them to, sover-
eign State concerns. 6
Global reality, however, has given wider play to these
private interests, be they individual, communal or corporate.
Their impact on the statist infrastructure can be ignored only
at the peril of international law's viability.'7 As such, a "con-
vergence" 8 of interests, public and private, is reshaping the
14. "Market economic theory and democratic process have become defining
elements of contemporary international relations. With their increasing acceptance
has come increased involvement of the private party in transborder transactions.
The structure of international law has yet to catch up with these developments."
Brand, supra note 4, at 5-6.
15. See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.IA.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; North American Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993); Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.151126 (1992); Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 10 (1987); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, pt. 3, at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967) [hereinafter
ICCPRI; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, pt. 3, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A16316 (1966) [hereinafter ESCRI.
16. For a related discussion on what has been termed the "international eco-
nomic law revolution," which calls for the breakdown of this traditional dynamic,
see Trachtman, supra note 1, at 36-37.
17. Brand, supra note 4, at 7 (contending that "the failure of the legal system
to fit the underlying economic and political structures can only lead to the disinte-
gration of the structures that do exist.").
18. Such convergence of "law applicable to private party transactions with law
traditionally reserved to sovereign relationships" is placed under the banner of
"international economic law;" the body of law that "represents much of the future
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creation and formation of international law, as well as the way
such law is effected in our market places and our societies. 9
The reshaping of international law's formation has been
acknowledged in the multilateral framework, on a limited
basis, particularly in the area of information sharing.2 Fur-
ther, there is a continual call for non-governmental and public
participation in multilateral policymaking and dispute resolu-
tion.2 Yet even with this greater transparency and input, the
traffic of the law remains vertical.22 Despite evolving recon-
structions within international law, it currently "retains no-
tions rooted in concepts of second-tier sovereignty that allow
only the sovereign to speak for the subject, and do not allow a
relationship between the subject and international law unless
and until the sovereign permits it."' States continue to react
of international law generally." Id. at 3-4. International economic law has been
called a "prime example[] of legal developments based on increasing international
interdependence and cooperation." DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 1.
19. As Brand points out, the interplay of domestic and international law is
changing as global economic relations evolve and proliferate, as exemplified in
increasing commercial partnerships between States and private parties. These
partnerships subject States to both domestic law and international arbitration. In
other instances, these partnerships make private parties subject to public inter-
national law, which has traditionally been reserved for State application. Brand,
supra note 4, at 5. See, e.g., Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1, 30 (1978) (in commercial relations between private parties
and States, private parties can choose applicable law at arbitration, be it national
law, international law or both). See also Ronald A. Brand, The Role of Interna-
tional Law in the Twenty-First Century: External Sovereignty and International
Law, 18 FORDHAMi INT'L L.J. 1685, 1692 (1995) [hereinafter Brand, External Sover-
eignty and International Law].
20. In the WTO context, commentators point to Article 5(2) of the Final Act
as providing a small window of opportunity for democratic mechanisms and
transparency within the trade forum. See Robert F. Housman, Democratizing Inter-
national Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INTIL L.J. 699, 713 (1994). That pro-
vision allows the WTO to "make appropriate arrangements for consultation and
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to
those of the WTO." Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 5(2), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1146 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations
in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INTIL ECON. L. 331 (1996); see also
Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996).
22. See Housman, supra note 20, at 713.
23. Brand, supra note 4, at 6. The recent incorporation of the GATT into the
WTO does not appear to have changed the equation. While the WTO framework
gives more weight to State enforcement of international trade rules, private parties
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and respond to private interests from above, while private
interests knock at the door from below, requesting entry.'
It is this author's contention that the "bottom-up" dynamic
inherent to the formation of international law will become
more prevalent as the world's markets and societies globalize,
particularly in light of current technological advances in trans-
portation and communications' and the insurgence of demo-
cratic governance.26 It is only by responsibly and consensually
seizing control of the private relation on the global scale that
private actors can become partners with States in the creation
of public international law.
have little voice in the process and remain absent from the workings of policy-
making. See id.
24. Some commentators argue that the future development of international
law, however, depends on an evolved conception of State sovereignty which "recog-
nizes that international law in the twentieth century has developed direct links
between the individual and international law." Brand, External Sovereignty and
International Law, supra note 19, at 1686. See also Trachtman, supra note 1, at
34-35 (stating that "[t]he very term 'international law' must be revisited and re-
evaluated, as the system of law that governs international relations has both
states and individuals as its subjects and objects").
25. See Rosenau, supra note 6, at 13.
26. Some commentators point to the insurgence of democracy as an engine of
change in and of itself within global relations and markets. See Brand, External
Sovereignty and International Law, supra note 19, at 1691-92. Conversely, one
author argues that democracy is not the engine of change, but the result of
change and contends that "aspirations [for democracy] are seen, rather, as a con-
sequence of the skill revolution that has transformed the competencies of citizens."
James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order, in ROSENAU &
CZElNdPIEL, supra note 6, at 290. Others argue that globalization has actually led to
the loss of democratic process and national governance. See JEREMY BRECHER &
TIM COSTELLO, GLOBAL VILLAGE OR GLOBAL PILLAGE: ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
FROM THE BOTTOM UP 29-31 (1994). The globalization of capital has decentralized
the loci of democratic processes, and has left governmental control to the mercy of
capital flight. See id. Because international mechanisms of control have not kept
up with globalization, the corporate accountability which arguably exists at the
national level does not exist on the international plane. See id. at 31. At the same
time, however, Brecher and Costello claim that purely economic governance
through international forums, such as the World Trade Organization, would "pre-
empt democratic self-government at local, national, regional and global levels" on
issues such as labor conditions and wages. See id. at 58. They argue that both
global business and global governance "is not based on the consent of the gov-
erned" and that both remain isolated from the very public that their decisions
impact. See id. at 63.
27. For example, demand for "participation in [international law's] creation,
interpretation and application" will grow with the proliferation of multilateral rules
that have an impact on the private actor. Brand, supra note 4, at 5. Currently,
however, "[t]he state remains the organ through which the individual is represent-
ed in the development of international norms and mechanisms . . . " Brand, Exter-
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The concept of "bottom-up" lawmaking is not new; indeed,
it is the foundation of democratic governance. While this Note
will touch upon the political dynamic found in such gover-
nance, the dynamic focused on here' is one of market action
and its normative implications. The model being established is
one of a symbiosis of State conviction (be it aspirational or
regulatory), private response (transactions between market
actors) and State accommodation (supportive State action and
interstate acceptance). The interplay of private interest and
public law implicated by this model currently exists within the
confines of multilateral formation of international labor law.2"
It is contended, however, that this interplay will become more
visible outside of those confines as the global authority and
accountability of private actors deviates from the historical
context of sovereign State power.30 Indeed, it is the Clinton
nal Sovereignty and International Law, supra note 19, at 1695. The change, thus
far, is that the State "may not always interfere when those norms are applied and
those mechanisms are implemented." Id. at 1695-96.
28. To a certain extent, this paper tracks "the Efficient Market Model" as
outlined in G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L.
359, 367-69 (1996). This model views private individuals, business, and interest
groups, rather than States, as "the 'essential players in international society who,
in seeking to promote their own interests, influence the national policies of States'
in international relations." Id. at 367. Philosophically, however, the argument in
this Note is more closely aligned with Shell's "Trade Stakeholders Model," which is
comparable to the Efficient Market Model in that it views individuals and groups
as "primary actors" in international law, but is broader in scope due to its recog-
nition of values and interests outside of traditional trade issues (such as environ-
mental and labor issues). See id. at 369-70. While this author does not argue that
market actors should be the sole arbiters of these non-trade values and interests,
the present argument for market implementation of fair labor standards does call
upon market actors to recognize labor standards as a matter of strategic business
policy and judgment.
29. Indeed, private interests provided the initial impetus for State action con-
cerning labor law, and have had representation within the International Labour
Organisation from its formation. See discussion infra Part III Al.
30. See generally Rosenau, supra note 6. "Globalization transforms the bases
of state authority from within and produces a multilevel post-Westphalian world
order in which the state remains important but only as one among several levels
of authority." Mark W. Zacher, The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple:
Implications for International Order and Governance, in ROSENAU & CZEMPIEL,
supra note 6, at 58, 81. Zacher continues to contend that "states are losing their
degree of autonomy in managing their domestic and international economic poli-
cies, because of both the intensity of the [global] interdependence and the develop-
ment of both explicit and implicit regimes." Id. This statement questions both the
authenticity and the viability of current emphasis on State action alone in the
formation of international law and norms.
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Administration's exploitation of international industry's in-
creased accountability that provides a fulcrum for the analysis
that this Note presents.
II. THE PRIVATE ACTOR IN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REALITY
On August 2, 1996, spurred by public pressure, President
Clinton held a press conference, where he was joined by lead-
ers of the U.S. apparel and footwear industries (the Indus-
try).3 ' The conference called for greater private oversight of
the operations and labor conditions of U.S. foreign production
and sourcing. 2 The Initiative announced the formation of a
presidential task force consisting of Industry representatives,
as well as labor union and human rights activists." The task
force's goal is to determine "steps" to be taken by the Industry
to assure humane working conditions abroad, and to formulate
domestic mechanisms for promulgating consumer information
regarding those conditions.'
Although the Initiative's work is behind schedule," the
31. Present at the press conference, and committed to the initiatives an-
nounced, were Nike Inc., Liz Claiborne, L.L. Bean, Tweeds, Patagonia and Nicole
Miller. Reich Hails Breakthrough at White House Meeting with Apparel and Foot-
wear Industry, FDHC FED. AGENCY Docs. (Dep't Labor), Aug. 2, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Feddoc File. Although the task force has since been named
the Apparel Industry Partnership, hereinafter it will be referenced as the "Initia-
tive" and the apparel industry will be referenced as the "Industry."
32. See id. See also Nancy Dunne & Stella Burch, Clinton Moves on Sweat-
shops, FIN. TIMES (USA Edition), Aug. 15, 1996, at 3; John F. Harris & Peter
McKay, Companies Agree to Meet on "Sweatshops", WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1996, at
A10; Clinton, Clothing Industry Announce Anti-Sweat Shop Plans, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; When It's
Cruel To Be Kind, STRATrS TIMES (SINGAPORE) (Comment/Analysis), Aug. 7, 1996,
at 26 [hereinafter Cruel to Be Kind].
33. Steven Greenhouse, Apparel Industry Group Moves to End Sweatshops,
N.Y. TMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A14.
34. At the press conference, President Clinton explained that industry repre-
sentatives had agreed to do the following.
"First, [to] take additional steps to ensure that the products they make
and sell are manufactured under decent and humane working conditions.
Second, [to] develop options to inform consumers that products they buy
are not produced under exploitative conditions."
WebWire-Delivers Statement on Fair Labor Practices; Washington D.C., FDCH PO-
LITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. President Clinton also urged corporations to be "good corporate citizens by
monitoring working conditions" of their contractors. Dunne & Burch, supra note
32, at 3.
35. See Courtney Schlisserman, Coalition Will Take On Sweatshops, PORTLAND
BROOK. J. INTL L.
substance of its work is slowly evolving, taking tentative shape
through various commitments and standards being negotiated
among its members. Despite the fact that a "groundbreaking
agreement" was reported in April of 1997 between Industry
representatives and other task force members, as of December
1997, a stalemate on the wage standard has been reported and
a sense of inertia intimated.36 The April announcement called
for Industry compliance with host countries' minimum wage
laws and further encouraged "a link between wages and the
basic needs of workers."37 Since then, other market actors
have made concerted efforts and have apparently embraced
wage standards reflecting, if not actually referencing, interna-
tional standards.38 As nebulous as this all may seem, articula-
tions of the prevailing international wage standards are now
being scrutinized by individuals and companies who can affect
and are affected by the standards, and while codes of conduct
do not have legal force, they have historically proven effica-
cious where widely accepted and buttressed by positive law.
It is likely that the Clinton Administration is aware of this
dynamic and is addressing the problem of sweatshop labor in a
manner that, arguably, makes an endrun around the barriers
created by traditional State sovereignty on the interstate level.
As such, the Initiative raises questions regarding the efficacy
of international law in addressing transnational labor practic-
es. A survey of international law evinces the fundamental
OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13141465.
36. This agreement sought to create "a code of conduct on wages and working
conditions, including a maximum 60-hour work week, for apparel factories that
American companies use around the world." Greenhouse, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. See generally Ron Scherer, Eye on Firms That Use Cheap Labor
Abroad-Service Will 'Certify' That Wares Meet Work Standards, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, Fri., Nov. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 280522 (comparing the
Initiative unfavorably with a more recently formed New York non-profit think tank
called Council on Economic Priorities, a group that allows a business to buy its
certification if the business complies with certain labor standards formulated by a
consortium of international business, labor unions and human rights groups). See
also Aaron Bernstein, Sweatshop Police: Business Backs an Initiative on Global
Working Conditions, Bus. WK. (Analysis & Commentary), Oct. 20, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 14813867. It should be noted, however, that many human rights and
labor groups view the Council on Economic Priorities with skepticism, and have
expressed fear that the CEP auditing process will require no "real change in
sweatshops," while serving as a public relations front for companies which receive
certification. Id.
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disconnection forming between interstate aspiration and pri-
vate result when sovereignty is given full sway in a world
where sovereign power is diminished by market influence. 9
Moreover, whatever the motivation behind the Initiative, it
exemplifies a market actor forced to step beyond its market
operations in order to address broader issues which reshape its
societal role in a transborder context;" a step which, if broad-
ly taken, impacts not only the market relation, but the legal
context within which the Industry operates.
This Note, thus, goes beyond a mere examination of the
Initiative itself, to address the potential legal impact of a con-
certed industry enforcement of normative practice within the
market relation. In so doing, this Note urges the Industry to go
beyond the Initiative's announced measures by acquiring con-
tractual commitments within its foreign market relations that
support existing international labor standards. In so urging,
the efficacy of international labor standards must be explored,
and the bottom line concerns of the Industry addressed. In
essence, it is argued that the long-term self-interest of the
Industry requires such responsible action.4' Finally, the im-
39. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy:
Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 988(1995) (noting that numerous scholars have acknowledged that the "global economy
diminishes the regulatory capacity of the nation-state.").
40. As two commentators observe, "questions relating to the human rights
responsibility of transnational investors stand at the intersection of public and
private spheres of law and policy." Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt,
Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in
China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 69 (1993). While acknowledging the impor-
tance of legislative regimes on the subject, Orentlicher and Gelatt conclude that
"effective leadership in defining those [corporate] responsibilities must come from
the business community itself." Id..
41. No one would deny that labor standards can encourage basic human
rights and serve to promote social justice. Yet, there has always been tension in
the labor context between social concerns and business objectives. 'The dualistic
argument of the protection of workers on the one hand and of competivity on the
other is the foundation of international labour law." LAMMY BE=TEN, INTERNATION-
AL LABOUR LAW: SELECTED ISSUES 2 (1993). A survey of economic analysis on
world trade clearly establishes wages and working conditions as "commodities"
within the operation of comparative advantage and industrial policy. See, e.g.,
Bruce Cummings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political
Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, 38 INTL
ORG. 1, 27-28 (1984) (explaining how the comparative advantage over other econo-
mies of both Taiwan and Korea derived from "relatively well-educated and skilled,
but low-paid, labor.") The argument made here regarding market implementation
does not dismiss the fundamental social concerns inherent to labor standards; it
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pact of potential State and international accommodation of
such contract relations will be discussed. It is State action that
will ultimately buttress market-implemented labor norms,
extending them into the realm of customary international law.
Ill. MULTILATERALISM AND THE STATE: THE ATrENUATION
BETWEEN PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE RESULT
Accountabilities shifting between the State and the mar-
ket, and the evolving amalgam of public need and private pow-
er, are sharpening the impact of sovereignty's operation within
the present multilateral construct. The historical competence of
multilateral solution rests in an accommodation of sovereign
concern and reliance upon State enforcement; yet, as "the
reach of the state [is] contract[ed] before the market,"42 State
power and will to regulate transnational actors diminishes.
Thus, while multilateral efforts to address substandard labor
conditions are not to be discouraged, without market volition,
the multilateral labor standard may likely remain
aspirational.4"
In form, labor standards are by no means absent from
current international law. They exist in numerous treaties
promulgated in various international forums. Such standards
have been expressed in broad human rights measures and
specific labor regulations. There is growing pressure to address
labor issues in trade forums as well. Yet there is attenuation
between the international labor standard and the actual mar-
merely acknowledges the private market actor's ability to contractually demand
such standards and explores the particular impact of that demand on international
law formation.
42. Paul, supra note 3, at 614.
43. A traditional argument is that all international "law" is merely
aspirational in that, without centralized international enforcement power, it relies
on sovereign will and command. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1954). Others argue that a less
vertical dynamic within the international order must be legally cognizable, thereby
framing international law as "legitimized politics." Burns H. Weston, The Role of
Law in Promoting Peace and Violence: A Matter of Definition, Social Values, and
Individual Responsibility, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 114, 116-
17 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976). Regardless of how one
frames the issue of what law is, law's legitimacy lies with its perceived impact;
unsupportable law is ultimately not perceived as law within the contexts in which
it is supposed to have effect. Accordingly, as widespread reporting of substandard
labor practices grows, international labor law is losing its legitimacy.
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ket practice which calls for an examination of the process from
which the standard derives. The dynamics of multilateralism
inform both the labor standard's scope and content, as well as
its viability in current market practices.
A. Multilateralism
While States often disagree on substantive rules governing
the global order," a general consensus has been reached
among nations regarding the procedural rules.45 Principles
underlying such agreed-upon procedures "identify the partici-
pants of the law-making process and establish appropriate
procedures to be followed for the generation of generally bind-
ing rules of conduct."46 The participants identified are the
States, and a generally recognized and increasingly powerful
mechanism is the multilateral treaty.
Such State consensus underlies multilateralism, the pro-
cess by which States come together to form a common legal
response to various international needs. Multilateralism has
been recognized as "[olne of the most important political-legal
factors" in the development of modern international law.47
The rubric of "political-legal" is essential to an understanding
of the multilateral process; "political considerations have to be
singled out as one of the most important factors influencing
present and future law-making activities." 8
The political essence of the multilateral mechanism is
44. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 13.
45. Id. at 13-14.
46. Id. at 14.
47. Id. at xiii. In the first 35 years of the United Nations' existence, over 200
multilateral treaties were concluded under its auspices. See id. at 2 n.1.
48. Id. at 4. The increasingly strident political dynamic involved in all things
international evidently presents a challenge for economists as well as law makers.
For instance, international law-making has proven difficult for economists to grasp
analytically. Benjamin Cohen explains that a convergence of political science and
economics is increasingly necessary to analyze international relations because the
standard economic models generally exclude non-economic motivation. See Benja-
min J. Cohen, The Political Economy of International Trade, 44 INTL ORG. 261,
271-72 (1990). Political scientists, on the other hand, have long recognized that
States have objectives beyond the mere maximization of income. See id. at 272.
"At a minimum, states also care about the preservation of their political sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity .... At a maximum, there may be a whole range of
additional values that they pursue, covering everything from domestic
distributional objectives to the international prestige of their national language and
culture." Id.
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founded on the traditional maxim of sovereign State equality
and consent.49 It is the express consent of ratifying States
that gives treaties their force.5" Yet a particular State's con-
sent on one issue is often used as a bargaining chip-creating
leverage and effecting compromise in consensus building.5' As
a result, internal domestic interests and the need to balance
varying State interests and power are often given sway over
any inherent practical value of the norms to be established.52
In examining existing labor standards, the political dy-
namic of international law creation cannot be ignored. State
self-interest and national market concerns have, to a very
large degree, shaped the articulation of international labor
standards, and the same considerations have determined their
implementation, or not, on the global scale.
1. Current Labor Standards Derived from the
Multilateral Process
From the beginning, international labor law was seen as
"the only possible solution" to provide humane working condi-
tions to employees while protecting the interests of employ-
ers.5" This balance between sustenance of the work force and
maintenance of competitive advantage is the same balance
argued for in this Note; it is the manner of implementation
which is different.'
49. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 53.
50. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (4th ed.
1990).
51. See generally Bernard M. Hoekman, Multilateral Trade Negotiations and
Coordination of Commercial Policies, in THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM:
ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (Robert M. Stern ed., 1993). This dynamic has
been referred to as "issue linkage," whereby a country's "behavior on a given issue
is contingent on others' actions on other issues." Id. at 36. See also DANILENKO,
supra note 2, at 17-21 (discussing the struggle between developing and developed
nations in identifying sources of law from which they can respectively exercise
new-found leverage or preserve historical power in the law-making process).
52. For a general overview of the issues faced in multinational trade negotia-
tions, see Hoekman, supra note 51.
53. See JAMES MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN, EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT STAN-
DARDS OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1992).
54. This Note does not argue that private market action should supplant in-
ternational efforts; it is the symbiotic relation between the two that is explored.
Further, the paper does not seek to deny the success of international labor efforts
thus far. It is also acknowledged that the elements missing in this Note's analysis
are the vital roles played by both employees and labor unions. Their exclusion
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It must be noted that private action's role in forming inter-
national labor standards is by no means a new concept; private
interests had goaded State efforts regarding labor standards in
the first instance, and private interests have a continuing
presence within the operations of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).
The first initiatives seeking formulation of international
standards were private; indeed, employers played a dominant
role in the initiatives.55 Private concerns and collective actions
led to the 1890 Conference of Berlin, the first multilateral
effort to address international labor issues.56 While the Con-
ference did not promulgate international standards, it did
stimulate subsequent national legislation.57 Further non-gov-
ernmental initiatives led to the formation of the private Inter-
national Association of Labor Legislation (IALL), the direct
predecessor to the ILO.5" It was the IALL that urged a 1905
governmental conference in Switzerland which led to the first
interstate conventions on the subject.59
Several years later, in the aftermath of World War I, the
newly-drafted Treaty of Versailles 0 authorized the formation
of a permanent agency to address common international con-
cerns regarding conditions of employment.6' Accordingly, the
ILO was created as an autonomous affiliate of the League of
Nations." After the League of Nations dispersed, the ILO was
from the analysis is not meant to downplay their importance in forming labor
standards, but merely to narrow the analysis presented here. Indeed, the labor
efforts of the United States in the trade arena, as well as the industry efforts
cited in this article, were prompted by employee and union actions. See BRECHER
& COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 129-38.
55. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 1-2.
56. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 7-9. The Conference issued recommen-
dations concerning mine and factory regulations, limits on Sunday hours and child
labor. See id. at 9.
57. See BETTEN, supra note 41, at 3-4.
58. See ZnMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10. This organization is referred to by
some authors as the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers
(IALPW). See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 4.
59. See id. The IALL drafted two conventions. One addressed night work for
women. The other addressed the use of white phosphorous in the match industry.
These treaties entered into force in 1912. See id.
60. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany,
June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 225 Consol. T.S. 188 [Treaty of Versailles].
61. See BETTEN, supra note 41, at 7-9.
62. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 11. Thirty-nine nations attended the
ILO's first Conference in 1919, where six Conventions were adopted. See BETIEN,
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secured in a 1946 agreement as a specialized agency of the
United Nations.'
An examination of the ILO's work presents both a vivid
example of the traditional multilateral process as well as a
unique model for private participation in that process. From its
formation, the ILO acknowledged the interdependency of na-
tional labor regulations," and the interrelation of interests
needing representation in the international arena. The ILO's
tripartite structure accommodates an interplay of interests by
involving governmental representatives, employers and work-
ers.' The ILO has been heralded as a positive example of
private participation in international law.6 Yet, its compre-
hensive approach has never been free from conflict; issues of
State sovereignty and industrial protectionism were obstacles
to early initiatives,67 and have remained so throughout the
supra note 41, at 11. Those six conventions covered hours of work; unemployment;
maternity protection; night work for women; minimum age; and night work for
young persons. See id. The States involved were the European nations and the
Soviet Union (both as then formulated), the United States, China, Japan, India,
Persia, Thailand, Canada and South Africa. Note, however, that the United States
did not actually become a member of the ILO until 1934. See id.
63. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 11.
64. "[Tlhe failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in
their own countries." ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 11.
65. The ILO consists of three main organs: the General Conference, the Gov-
erning Body, and the Secretariat. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 13. The first two
of these organs are tripartite in nature: its members are workers, employers and
governmental agents. See id. The balance, however, even within this structure is
weighted toward governmental interests, with each member nation having two
representatives, and one representative from the employer and worker factions. See
id. at 10. It must be noted, however, that the ILO Conference Committee on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, which has certain oversight
functions, is composed of governmental, industry and labor representatives, all
with equal voting power. See VIRGINIA A. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABouR CONVEN-
TIONS AND NATIONAL LAW: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUTOMATIC INCORPORATION
OF TREATIES IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 19 (1982). This Conference Committee
makes partial review of reports submitted by an independent Committee of Ex-
perts regarding State compliance, and can address noncompliance in its own re-
port. See id. at 19-20. The process is essentially political because inclusion of a
State's noncompliance in the Committee's report is considered "the most serious
moral censure available within the ILO regular supervisory system." Id. at 20.
Thus, due to the political sensitivities involved, the ILO General Conference has,
at times, not adopted portions of the Committee's reports involving these censures.
See id.
66. See BETTEN, supra note 41, at 13-19.
67. For instance, when the first 1890 multilateral conference attempted to
establish a reporting system, strict measures were rejected, with the British dele-
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ILO's existences
The ILO's main function is to establish labor standards
and promote information sharing among member States. 9 Yet
despite declarations, and even legislation, many note that the
standards promulgated have had little force in the actual
workplace.70 This failure of implementation is largely due to
lack of an interstate enforcement mechanism attaching to the
ILO promulgations.7' From the beginning it was decided that
nations would be bound by ILO commitments only to the ex-
tent that such obligations were incorporated into national law.7'
gates making it clear that "they refused to allow their industrialists to be subject-
ed to the control of a foreign power." BETrEN, supra note 41, at 3-4. See also,
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 13-14 (discussing the United States' turbulent rela-
tionship with the ILO).
68. The ILO has, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, experienced major con-
troversy due to the politics of State sovereignty and was accused of going beyond
its mission in taking political stances. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 19. Among
the actions that caused such controversy were the ILO's condemnation of South
Africa's apartheid regime; its criticism of Chile's gross violations of the freedoms of
association; its attack on alleged racial discrimination of Israel's trade union poli-
cy;, and its granting observer status to the PLO. See id. In response to such ac-
tions, the United States withdrew from the ILO in 1977, but returned two years
later. See id. The political strife abated somewhat during the 1980s, id., and the
United States modified its attitude toward the ILO. See Secretary of State George
Shultz, U.S. Role in the ILO (statement before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, Sept. 11, 1985), in DEP't ST. BULL., Nov. 1985, available
in LEXIS, DOS File (explaining why the United States left, and returned to, the
M1O and encouraging broader U.S. ratification of ILO conventions).
69. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 11. The ILO's goals, enumerated in a
1944 amendment to its Constitution include full employment and a higher stan-
dard of living;, wage policies that "ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to
all;" protection of collective bargaining;, ensuring safety standards; equality; and the
protection of women and children in the work force. Declaration Concerning the
Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation, Oct. 9, 1946, art. IIH,
62 Stat. 3554, 15 U.N.T.S. 104 [hereinafter Philadelphia Declaration]. See also
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat.
2712, 225 Consol. T.S. 378 [hereinafter ILO Const.].
70. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 2.
71. See id.
72. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 10. This has led to much confusion in
States where "automatic incorporation" of international commitments occurs, espe-
cially where the concept of "self-execution" can bar national courts' recognition of
the obligations. I "at 20-25. It has also led to reticence in ratification on the part
of "legislative incorporation" States where, once an international obligation is incor-
porated, its binding character is clear. For a thorough treatment of the incorpora-
tion issue within international labor law, see LEARY, supra note 65. A large num-
ber of States have automatic incorporation whereby an international treaty be-
comes national law immediately upon the treaty's ratification (although some coun-
tries require subsequent publication before the treaty takes legal force). See id. at
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Even with its unique tripartite structure of representa-
tion," the ILO's competence is shaped by the accommodation
of sovereign prerogatives which impair the labor standard's
operation in national law and, therefore, in private practice.
Moreover, as capital and labor have mobilized, States' power
and will to effectuate labor standards within their own borders
have been subverted.74 Thus, national law is more often used
to deflect, rather than implement, the international labor stan-
dard.
2. The ILO as a "Political-Legal" Body
A survey of the ILO's work regarding international wage
and working conditions evinces the "political-legal" rubric at
play. The ILO Constitution provides that States with "imper-
fect development" may modify or "opt out" of norms established
by the Organization.75 The provision allows countries with
2. However, the doctrine of "self-execution7 can block national enforcement of a
treaty norm even if ratification has been achieved. If a treaty has not been legis-
latively enabled, the doctrine requires a judicial determination of the self-executing
nature of the treaty norm at issue. The norm will not be enforced unless an in-
tent that it should operate with legal force is found. See BURNS H. WESTON, ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 194-96 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
WORLD ORDER]. "Legislative incorporation," on the other hand, requires statutory
enactment of all treaties before they have the force of national law. LEARY, supra
note 65, at 2.
73. Ironically, the realization of international labor standards has been frus-
trated by the power dynamics between the ILO constituencies. While the ILO's
tripartite structure has "without doubt contributed greatly to the relatively success-
ful functioning of the Organisation[, it has also] been a source of serious conflict."
BETrEN, supra note 41, at 14. For instance, in the late 1930s, employer delegates
challenged the newly-joined Soviet delegation, arguing that the notion of the
"State" as employer prevented the delegation from being truly tripartite in compo-
sition. The Soviet Union maintained that the concept of an "employer" did not
necessarily mean "private" employer. The issue was debated before the ILO's Gov-
erning Body with no resolution. Ultimately, the Soviet Union withdrew from the
ILO in 1940, but the issue arose again upon its return in 1954 (when challenges
were also levelled at six other socialist countries). See id. at 14-15. In-fighting
continued between employer delegates until 1968 when the employers' group
stopped trying to bar the voting power of socialist employers. See iU at 15. Anoth-
er problem within the ILO's structure has been trade -union representation from
countries where the freedom to associate is regularly violated. See id. at 16. A
common practice in this context has been the establishment of "puppet!' unions by
dictatorships existing in such States. The ILO's response here has been that, while
freedom to associate is a basic tenet of the Organization's constitution, its exis-
tence is not a prerequisite to a State's membership. See id. at 16-17.
74. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 39, at 989.
75. ILO Const., supra note 69, art. 19(3).
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"insufficiently developed economies" to apply lower standards
than others.76 This provision, along with other mechanisms of
"flexibility" (including permissible denunciation of isolated
clauses and the use of "open" wording subject to wide interpre-
tation)77 exemplify both the necessities and vagaries of multi-
lateral law-making.7 s
Many of the ILO Conventions address working conditions
within specific industries, but a large number of them have
received little support from membership.79 Among the conven-
tions receiving substantial support are those prohibiting forced
labor, supporting freedom of association, and requiring equal
pay for equal work."0 These labor norms are three which have
been viewed historically as "fundamental," receiving State
support not only via the ILO, but through numerous human
rights instruments as well.8
But it is working conditions, including pay, that the Indus-
try Initiative addresses. These have received far more varied
ILO treatment for reasons that elucidate the "endrun" on sov-
ereignty perceived in the Initiative's establishment.
The chief barrier to an effective international approach to
working conditions and pay is that, regardless of international
declarations, such issues are ultimately issues of national law
and are typically regulated by national labor codes, collective
76. BETrEN, supra note 41, at 22.
77. See id.
78. One example of this dynamic is that the revision of an ILO convention's
standard does not necessarily lead to universal renunciation of the initial promul-
gation. See BETEN, supra note 41, at 23. States can choose to remain committed
to the first Convention, can renounce the first by ratifying its revision, or can
choose to be bound by both promulgations. Id This structure obviously impairs
uniformity, but may be helpful when a convention is based on reciprocity and
creates obligations between States. Id.
79. See BErEN, supra note 41, at 25 n.21. It should be noted that many non-
ratifying States are less developed than those that do ratify. See id. at 27.
80. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 25. Among these are the Forced Labour
Convention No. 29 (128 ratifications as of 1992), the Forced Labour Convention
No. 105 (111 ratifications as of 1992), the Freedom of Association Conventions
Nos. 87 and 98 (with 99 and 114 ratifications respectively), the 1951 Equal Remu-
neration Convention No. 100 (112 ratifications), the 1958 Discrimination in Em-
ployment and Occupation Convention No. 111 (110 ratifications). Id.
81. BETrEN, supra note 41, at 66. For a thorough discussion of the freedom of
association in the international trade context, see id. at 67-123. For the same on
forced labor, see id. at 125-55, and on equality on employment, see id. at 157-85.
82. See discussion supra Part H.
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agreements within given sectors, and judicial decisions.' De-
spite this barrier, the ILO has consistently addressed working
hours and leisure requirements, as well as wage and safety
standards.'
The issue of working hours received attention at the first
ILO Congress in 1919.' Varying norms have been debated
and articulated ever since,86 but with mixed success.87 For
example, Convention No. 61, which attempts to extend limited
work weeks to the textile industry, did not have enough
ratifications to enter into force as of 19 9 3 .s
International wage standards have also proven difficult to
implement and regulate.89 A determination of what consti-
tutes a "fair wage" in any given environment or occupation
depends greatly on national circumstances.' Moreover, mac-
roeconomic issues-such as fluctuations in commodity prices at
the international level-thwart wage policy advancement at
83. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 187-88.
84. See id. at 189-211.
85. See id. at 11, 189. The first Convention was limited to the industrial
sector. That convention set the work day at eight hours and the work week at 48
hours. See id. at 191. Industrial enterprises that involved processes requiring con-
tinuous shifts were allowed a 56-hour work week. See id. This convention was
ratified by 50 member States. See id. at 192.
In the 1930s, additional ILO conventions attempted, albeit with very limited
success, to reduce the standard 48-hour work week to 40 hours. See id. at 192-93.
In the 1960s, all that could be achieved on this front was Recommendation No.
116, which encourages member States to formulate policies which would reduce
work hours and to strive for the standard of a 40-hour work week. See id. at 193.
86. See generally NICHOLAS VALTICOs, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 134-40
(1979).
87. See id. (highlighting the difficulties encouraged by the labor movement in
working toward a reduction of work hours). Valticos calls the effort to reduce
hours the "most prized" of the labor movement's achievements. Id. at 134.
88. See BETrEN, supra note 41, at 193 n.15. While some western countries re-
cently have shown a willingness to lessen working hours; absent from this trend
are the United States, Japan and Great Britain, each fearing the loss of a compet-
itive edge to the others. See id& at 197 n.29. As automation and communications
have advanced, employers have generally showed more interest in "flex" hours
than hour reductions, and have sought support for the use of part-time workers to
meet productivity needs. See id. at 197-198. While employees and their representa-
tives have not fought these adjustments, there is general concern that workers
will, as a result, receive less protection. See id. at 198. While the ILO has con-
ducted various studies relating to this concern, normative work has yet to be con-
ducted in the area. See id
89. See VALTICOS, supra note 86, at 125.
90. BETrEN, supra note 41, at 206; see also VALTICOS, supra note 86, at 126.
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the national level.9' Nonetheless, the ILO has followed a poli-
cy stating that economic and social conditions of a given coun-
try will not excuse abrogation of any ILO convention obliga-
tions to which a State has consented.2
It should be noted that wage policy does not consist of
wage fixing alone, but also encompasses overtime pay ahd
prohibited wage deductions.93 While these additional factors
were addressed in the 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Conven-
tion,94 the earliest wage standards set forth by the ILO in-
volved only the fixing of minimum wages." In 1970, a new
convention of broader application was promulgated to address
sub-subsistence wages; Convention No. 131 along with Recom-
mendation No. 135 (hereinafter 1970 Convention), requires the
establishment of minimum wage structures and states that
such measures must "have the force of law."96 Although the
1970 Convention's provisions contain open language-and seek
to accommodate traditional State concerns-the earlier, less
specific and less demanding Convention has received almost
twice the State ratifications as has the 1970 Convention.9"
While the ILO has done a great deal to raise awareness of,
and address varying labor concerns among the States,98 the
91. See BETTEN, supra note 41, at 206-07.
92. See id. at 207.
93. See id. at 208.
94. See id. at 215.
95. See id. at 208-09 (discussing ILO Convention No. 26 and Recommendation
No. 30, adopted in 1928). The Convention requires ratifying States to "create or
maintain a minimum wage fixing machinery" in certain occupational sectors. Id.
See also VALTICOS, supra note 86, at 126-28 (discussing the 1928 Convention).
96. BErEN, supra note 41, at 209 (citing Convention No. 131, arts. 1 and
2(1)). Under Convention No. 131, States may decide for themselves the measures
to be taken to fulfill their obligations under the treaty. See id. at 210. The Con-
vention demands, however, that States, when devising such measures, take the
following into account:
(a) the needs of workers and their families, bearing in mind general
levels of wages, cost of living, social security benefits and living stan-
dards of other social groups[,] and
(b) economic factors, including requirements of economic development,
levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a
high level of employment.
Id. at 210 (citing Convention No. 131, art. 3).
97. As of 1992, the 1919 Convention had received 69 ratifications, while the
1970 Convention had only 34 ratifications. See BETIEN, supra note 41, at 211.
98. Even without extensive ratification, the ILO's work has compelled the revi-
sion of numerous national labor laws, in that "sometimes whole passages of ILO
Conventions are transcribed into national law, even if the Convention itself is not
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recent expansion of global trade has heightened those con-
cerns. 9 In response, the ILO has begun to consider address-
ing labor standards by "tackling" trade issues, while continuing
its "social focus" agenda. In its Spring 1996 meeting, the ILO
Governing Body decided to extend the tenure of its Working
Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalisation of Inter-
national Trade.'00 This step was taken to foster member
States' commitment to a parallel development of trade liberal-
ism and social progress, in order to fulfill their obligations to
the ILO.' The convergence of approaches reflects a growing
State acknowledgement of the impact low wages and labor
conditions have on the flow of international trade. 0 2
3. International Labor Standards and Trade
The issues of sovereign power and State concerns that
exist within the international labor law context are equally
prevalent in the international trade arena.03 While linkage
between the labor standard and trade has been attempted in
such arenas as the GATT and the WTO,' °4 some States re-
ratified." Id. at 389. See generally id. at 386-94. Moreover, the many separate ILO
Conventions and Recommendations "adopted over the years ... constitute, from a
certain point of view, a comprehensive whole which has often been described as
the 'International Labour Code." See BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 46.
99. See ILO Governing Body Tackles Social Dimensions of Global Trade, EUR.
INFO. SERV., Apr. 1, 1996, available in News Library, Ecnews File [hereinafter
Social Dimensions of Global Trade].
100. The Working Party first met in November of 1995. Id.
101. See id.
102. See WILLIAM A. LOVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND COM-
PETING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES i-xvi (1987) (focusing on job relocation and wage im-
pact within advanced industrialized nations).
103. This is exemplified by the Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) re-
ceived by lesser-developed countries (LDCs) under the GATT. See generally, David
M. Trubek, Protectionism and Development Time for a New Dialogue?, 25 N.Y.U.
J. IML L. & POL. 345 (1993). According to the "structuralist" school of economic
thought (which stresses the historical trade relations between developed and less-
er-developed), the GATTs General System of Preferences (GSP) and the system of
S&DT were adopted to ameliorate income disparities between developed and devel-
oping countries. See id. at 350. The GSP relaxes the core GATT principles of liber-
alization for LDCs, providing for graduation into the formal GATT structure once
an LDC's economy develops. See id. at 350-52. Countering this mechanism are
GATT "safeguards," which enable developed countries to protect their domestic
employment levels, which ultimately would be threatened by wage differentials as
a factor of "comparative advantage." Id. at 353-54.
104. For instance, a fair labor standard was informally proposed for the GATT
by the United States in 1953, but the initiative failed. See Watson, supra note 9,
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main reluctant to commit labor issues to the "liberalization"
trend in global trade policy."°5
Current trade policy among nations can be characterized
as striving-to the extent possible-for absolute free trade. As
an economic theory, free trade strives for the least amount of
trade restriction and governmental intervention, and the great-
est amount of economic openness in light of various political
concerns. Thus, doctrinally governmental regulation, be it
domestic or international, is antithetical to traditional free
trade doctrine.0 6 The inherent paradox of this perspective is
that, in the multilateral context, it is the State which, in effect,
intervenes and stands as exclusive arbiter of its internal mar-
ket interests.0 7 Moreover, with the globalization of markets,
at 1253. Further U.S. initiatives were put forward during the 1974 Tokyo Round
of the GATT. Id. The initiatives received little or no support, and the United
States eventually dropped them because they "might have complicated ongoing
negotiations on other issues." Id. The United States did, however, submit a propos-
al to the 1979 GATT Consultative Group of 18, "calling for consideration of mini-
mum international labor standards as part of the post-Tokyo Round work pro-
gram." Id. As in 1953, these initiatives failed. See id. More recently, in anticipa-
tion of the April 15, 1994 signing of the Uruguay Round, U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Mickey Kantor announced that the Clinton Administration would issue a
statement outlining initiatives addressing, among other issues, "workers' rights."
Id. at 1245.
The WTO, at its December 1996 Ministerial Conference, hotly debated the
linkage of labor to trade. See WTO Ministerial Conference-Day 3: Labour Stan-
dards Still the Thorny Issue, STRArrs TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 12, 1996, at 47
available in NEXIS, News Library, ALLNEWS file.
Ultimately, a reference to labor standards was included in the binding Min-
isterial Declaration, which establishes the ILO to be the competent forum for labor
standards, and emphasizes that the comparative advantage for low-wage countries
would not be questioned. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Fails to Win Backing for Plan
to Study TradelLabor Standards Link, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1939
(Dec. 18, 1996).
105. See, e.g., WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 104 (pointing out opposi-
tion to linkage by such States as Malaysia, Pakistan and India). While U.S. efforts
at linkage have been hampered by the various national agendas typically present
at multinational trade negotiations (MTNs), see generally Hoekman, supra note 51,
the United States received tentative support from some developed countries on its
GATT labor initiatives. See Watson, supra note 9, at 1254-55. Some developing
countries, however, have rejected the initiatives as "protectionist" and "misplaced
Western paternalism." Id.
106. See generally Hoekman, supra note 51.
107. This construct dovetails with the "historical underpinnings" of sovereignty,
which is explored in Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, supra
note 19, at 1687-90. Brand refers to Hobbes' influence, elaborating the social con-
tract between sovereign and individual where the individual surrenders his or her
voice on certain issues to the sovereign, in order that the sovereign can preserve
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international trade law is arguably the most intrusive of inter-
national legal regimes, except perhaps, those addressing the
methods of war."8
While it is clear that the State plays a role in the trade
arena, the role of market actors-the very actors that effect
trade-in multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) remains a
passive one, in the sense of the traditional social contract be-
tween government and private actors. °9 While calls to
change this dynamic are steadily growing, they have yet to be
answered."0 Thus, while it would logically seem that the
labor standard (as a component of comparative advantage)"'
"peace and common defense" for all. Id. at 1687. While Brand feels that the notion
of sovereignty as a social contract is an "internal concept," and is "a mistake" as
"applied to states in their relations to other states," id. at 1690, "current notions
of sovereignty" cannot be generalized. For a survey of authors writing on the is-
sue, see id. at 1685 n.2.
108. In the context of threats to global peace, United Nations member States
place themselves under the auspices of the Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER,
CHAP. VII. Similarly, changes made to the dispute resolution process of the WTO
(as compared to the prior GATT system) evince an erosion of the sovereignty prin-
ciple in the face of global trade regulation. See Shell, supra note 28, at 362-65.
Shell argues that the GATT's dispute resolution system supported the realist con-
struct of international relations by assuming "that a state would comply with
international trade rules only when that state deemed it in its immediate self-
interest to do so." Id, at 365. Under the GATT system, a disfavored State had the
ability to veto a panel decision with a single vote. See id. at 362. The WTO struc-
ture (which displaces the GATs system) denies the losing State a veto, and only
permits a panel decision to be overturned if all member States, including the
winning State, vote to reverse it. See id. at 362-63. Thus, by participating in the
WTO to legislate trade, a State allows its sovereignty to be diminished.
Conversely, some commentators argue that the WTO's dispute resolution
process actually bolsters State sovereignty through its reliance on voluntary com-
pliance in connection with a system of graduated incentives which serve a State's
interests. See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:
Less is More, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 416 (1996).
109. See generally Brand, supra note 4.
110. See generally Watson, supra note 9.
111. The theory of comparative advantage has been described as the "driving
force behind international trade." Not So Absolutely Fabulous, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4,
1995, at 89. It is rooted in the work of David Ricardo, which posits that "nations
are materially better off, individually as well as collectively, if they produce only
those goods and services that they are most efficient at producing and import the
rest of what they need." Shell, supra note 28, at 364 n.27. From the perspective of
classical free trade theory, emerging industrial countries within today's market are
a "a natural outcome" of the evolution of comparative advantage when that term
is defined as having resulted from "relative factor endowments in the availability
of land, labor and capital" held by a particular country. James M. Lutz & Young
Whan Kihl, The NIs, Shifting Comparative Advantage, and the Product Life Cy-
cle, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 113, 115 (1990) (addressing the "shifting" quality of coin-
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would be intrinsic to international trade negotiations, its ab-
sence from current trade negotiations speaks less to logic, than
to State sovereignty, interest and politics." Ultimately, the
prospect of an international labor standard becoming a trade
rule may be defeated by issues of sovereignty. Unlike the pros-
pect of trade constraints on environmental standards,"
3
"trade constraints on domestic labor standards" may not be so
readily accepted because such standards may not have "demon-
strable external effects."" The issue is complicated by the
fact that any possible showing of external effects from domestic
labor standards gives rise to the specter of protectionism." 5
parative advantage in conjunction with the "product life cycle"). When demand for
a particular product line increases and its manufacture becomes more standard-
ized, new producers enter the market (for example, a newly industrialized country
(NIC) such as China). See id. at 115-16. To counter, the original producer (usually
an already industrialized nation), who has higher operation costs, shifts production
to less industrialized nations to take advantage of that nation's resources and low
wages. See id. At a later stage, when the NIC finds itself with an evolved econo-
my and increased operational costs, it too shifts production to foreign shores. See
id. at 115-16.
Such shifts in comparative advantage, and the elemental factors involved
(such as wages and operational costs), impact the shaping of global trade and the
exercise of competition policies. Indeed, the operation of comparative advantage
and product life cycle theory could be likened to what some authors refer to as
the "race to the bottom" and "downward spiral" of the global economy. See
BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 22-28.
112. For instance, in a 1994 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
communique, foreign ministers expressed serious concern that attempts by devel-
oped States to include "social clauses [addressing such issues as a labor standard]
into international trade agreements would restrict market access and adversely
affect the employment opportunities in developing countries." ASEAN Post-Ministe-
rial Conference, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 1994, at 545. Interestingly, some
labor activists agree with this stance. BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note 26, at
136. One such activist has attacked U.S. attempts to inject labor issues into the
WTO framework as "quite clearly prompted not by feelings of goodwill toward
Third World workers, but by protectionist attempts to prevent the transfer of jobs
from the North to the South.'" Id. at 136 (quoting Martin Khor, director of the
Third-World Network).
113. A strong argument can be made that the effects of a State's environmen-
tal practices on its neighbors, as well as on the global commons, warrant multilat-
eral efforts addressing environmental issues. While many developing countries are
wary of such efforts, there is a growing recognition among these countries that
"upward harmonization of environmental standards" can sometimes be to their
advantage. See Watson, supra note 9, at 1257.
114. Watson, supra note 9, at 1257.
115. Many developing countries object to the imposition of international labor
standards. See Kimberly Green, Labor Standards in the European Union: The
Effects on Multinationals, 18 HOUS. J. INTL L. 497, 517 (1996). Further, these low-
wage countries argue that these standards are merely an attempt by the more
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The labor standard has not, however, been totally divorced
from trade discussions. In fact, the labor standard has some
historical basis in at least one trade forum-the 1948 Havana
Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO)."'
The Havana Charter states that member States "recognize
that unfair labor conditions, particularly in production for
export, create difficulties in international trade, and, accord-
ingly, each member shall take whatever action may be feasible
and appropriate to eliminate such conditions within its territo-
ry."117 The ITO, however, never materialized, and, instead,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)"' was
established and has since become the "primary multilateral
[trade] forum." 9
The GATT did not adopt the fair labor provisions of the
Havana Charter,' although its "Preamble recognizes that
expanded trade is not an end itself and that it should contrib-
ute to other objectives (e.g., '... . raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment)." '2 Despite this language, howev-
er, the implementation of international labor standards is, at
best, "an indirect objective" of the GATT.'22
Despite this fact, labor issues have played an increasingly
prominent role in the GATT, and now in the WTO.'" Yet,
developed countries to "take away their comparative advantage." Pratap Chatterjee,
Trade-GATT: Last Minute Drive to Highlight Workers' Rights, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Apr. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intres File, at *1. Moreover, this
perspective is not limited to underdeveloped countries. Ongoing conflict exists be-
tween the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union regarding imple-
mentation of the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights and the
Social Charter Action Programme, both of which contain certain measures regard-
ing labor treatment. See Green, supra at 500-03. The United Kingdom's ongoing
obstructionist tactics has brought about accusations that the United Kingdom is
engaging in "social dumping-eroding workers' rights in a bid to attract foreign
investment." Europe's Single Market Labour Pains, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at
71.
116. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference
on Trade and Employment, Ch. II, art. 7, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/78 (1948) [herein-
after Havana Charter].
117. Havana Charter, id., art. 7.
118. GATT, supra note 15.
119. Hoekman, supra note 51, at 29.
120. Note, however, that the GATT at Article XXIX "states that contracting
parties undertake to observe the general principles of certain chapters of the Ha-
vana Charter, including Chapter II. GATT, supra note 15, art. 29. See also Wat-
son, supra note 9, at 1253.
121. Watson, supra note 9, at 1253.
122. Id. at 1253.
123. Citing "renewed interest" in the labor issue and its incorporation into the
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protectionist motives (real and perceived) may very well stymie
the integration of labor into the trade arena.' Some, howev-
er, point to the recent North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAFTA Labor Agreement)' 2 as "open[ing] a
new chapter in the relationship between worker rights and
trade policy." "
GATT agenda, Watson contemplates future discussions, framing them in the lexi-
con of trade concerns: "We are likely... to hear variations on the theme that
trade policy must level the playing field' by making labor standards, wage rates,
and worker benefits identical around the globe." Id. at 1255.
124. The mere threat of foreign competition has become a "chief bargaining
card" for employers negotiating with labor unions. BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra
note 26, at 22. Recent U.S. legislation acknowledges this development and its
impact on workers. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101(14)(B), 102 Stat. 1121, 1125 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2901 (1988)) (where the United States aimed for
GATT adoption of the principle that "denial of worker rights should not be a
means for a country or its industries to gain competitive advantage in interna-
tional trade"). Moreover, developing countries' fears of protectionist motives may
not be unfounded. United States Trade Ambassador Mickey Kantor has publicly
stated that to have "prosperity here at home, build jobs and serve the American
people,' this country will have to insist 'that its trading partners follow the same
standards, including worker standards and environmental rules, that we do.'
Hobart Rowen, New Trade Buzzword, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1993, at A21. French
officials have used similarly strong language in addressing the issue within the
context of the European Union, arguing that the Union should seek "protection
against unfair foreign competition which is based on lower wages ... and envi-
ronmental standards" and that without resolution of these problems, there will be
"'major distortions of competition and uprooting of companies [in western Europe].'"
Andrew Gowers & David Buchan, Balladur Calls for EU Action Against 'Unfair'
Trade, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993, at 1 (quoting French Prime Minister Edouard
Balladur).
125. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAFTA Labor Agreement].
126. Watson, supra note 9, at 1256. Upon the Bush administration's 1990 an-
nouncement that it would pursue a trade agreement with Mexico, labor groups
raised concerns that such an agreement would hurt U.S. workers and manufactur-
ers. See Michael S. Barr et al., Labor and Environmental Rights in the Proposed
Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement, 14 Hous. J. INTL L. 1, 3 (1991).
These groups argued against the agreement based on the troubling wage differen-
tial between Mexican and U.S. workers. See id. As of 1988, the Mexican wage was
one-ninth the American wage. See id. at 10 n.43. The fear was that lower Mexican
wages would lead to unfair price competition for American businesses, which
would result in a lowering of U.S. wages and/or the transplantation of production
and jobs to Mexico. See id. at 3-4. Both Mexican and American labor groups
voiced concern that the agreement would also serve as a disincentive for the Mexi-
can government to improve enforcement of wage and labor standards within its
borders. See id. In response to these fears, the NAFTA Labor Agreement was
adopted. NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra note 125. It entered into force on Janu-
ary 1, 1994 between Canada, Mexico and the United States as a side agreement
to the North American Free Trade Agreement. See also North American Free
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4. The NAFTA Labor Agreement as a
"Political-Legal" Framework
A close review of the NAFTA Labor Agreement reveals the
presence of the same sovereign protections apparent in ILO
promulgations; protections which present a framework for
sovereign control of labor practices more than an articulation
of international labor standards.
The NAFTA Labor Agreement establishes eleven "guiding"
labor principles 7 to be promoted by the State Parties to "the
maximum extent possible."1" The agreement requires its par-
ties to enforce their domestic labor laws," 9 affirms that labor
standards are primarily a domestic concern, 30 and further
Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2022, 32 I.L.M. 296, 32
I.L.M. 605, 698 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
127. NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra note 125, Annex 1. The eleven principles
are enumerated as follows:
(1) Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize .
(2) The right to bargain collectively ... ; (3) The right to strike ...
(4) Prohibition of forced labor ... ; (5) Labor protections for children and
young persons ... ; (6) Minimum employment standards . . . ;
(7) Elimination of employment discrimination ... ; (8) Equal pay for
women and men ... ; (9) Prevention of occupational injuries and illness-
es . . .. ; (10) Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illness-
es . . . ; (11) Protection of migrant workers.
Id.
128. NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra note 125, art. 1(b). Although Mexico's
labor standards (many of which are constitutionally based) are quite strong on
paper, the enforcement of those standards has been very weak, particularly in the
"informal" job sector. See Barr, supra note 126, at 11-13. While there has been
incremental gain and enforcement in wage and condition practices within Mexico's
formal sector, the relationship between the Mexican government and labor unions
has led to collective wage agreements negotiated at levels below the inflation rate.
See id. at 12-13. Evidently, the Mexican government perceived its labor problems
as "a choice between foreign investment and workers rights." Id. at 14. This per-
ception was supported by the statements of some U.S. officials. For instance, in
1987 House Representative Jim Kolbe, wrote in The New York Times that despite
substandard wages, deplorable working conditions, and environmental hazards
within Mexico's border industries, if standards were raised, American manufactur-
ers would be faced with moving their operations to the Pacific Rim or "going out
of business altogether." Jim Kolbe, Made In Mexico; Good for the U.SA., N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1987, §3 (Business), at 2.
129. See NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra note 125, arts. 1(f), 3(1), 4(2)(a). The
Agreement also provides for certain "procedural guarantees," involving administra-
tive and judicial enforcement and review, requiring, among other things, due pro-
cess of law, transparency, disinterested tribunals and written decisions. Id. art. 5,
32 I.L.M. at 1504. Each State Party must publish its labor laws and regulations
after public comment, and promote public awareness of its labor law. Id. arts. 6,
7.
130. NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra note 125, art. 2. Each State Party does
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requires the States to ensure that their domestic policy sup-
ports "high labor standards." 3' As such, the sovereign pre-
rogatives of each State govern the labor practices within its
borders;'32 indeed, the introductory paragraph to the NAFTA
Labor Principles exemplifies sovereignty at work:
The following are guiding principles that the Parties are
committed to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law,
but do not establish common minimum standards for their
domestic law. They indicate broad areas of concern where the
Parties have developed, each in its own way, laws, regula-
tions, procedures and practices that protect the rights and
interests of their respective workforces."
The guiding principles enunciated are general in nature, and
the wage provision is not normative in substance."
It would seem, therefore, that the NAFTA Labor Agree-
ment, while unprecedented in that it is linked to multilateral
trade agreement, ultimately bows to the same sovereignty con-
cerns which have thwarted international labor standards in
other regimes. Still, the growing "social dimensions of
trade... [make it] increasingly difficult to divorce economics
and trade from social issues. In fact, certain domestic forces
remain ever vigilant to ensure that the promotion of interna-
tional trade efficiency does not result in, or serve as an excuse
have the discretion to form national advisory committees, comprising members of
the public (including labor and business representatives) and governmental adviso-
ry committees (including State and provincial representatives.) Id. arts. 17, 18.
131. Id. art. 2.
132. For example, the Agreements dispute mechanism which permits an Evalu-
ation Committee of Experts (ECE) to be convened. See id. art. 23(1). This ECE
then considers, in a "non-adversarial manner, patterns of practice by each Party in
the enforcement of its . . . labor standards." Id. art. 23(2).
133. NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra 125, Annex 1.
134. The principle addressing wages refers to "[t]he establishment of minimum
employment standards, such as minimum wages and overtime pay, for wage earn-
ers, including those not covered by collective agreements." NAFTA Labor
Agreement, supra note 125, Annex I, para. 6. The only principle addressing work-
ing conditions calls for State parties to "minimize the causes of occupational inju-
ries and illnesses." Id., Annex I, para. 9, 32 I.L.M. at 1516. The non-normative
nature of the wage principle is emphasized by the inclusion of wages in the defini-
tion of "technical labor standards." Id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M. 1513-14. As such, the
wage provision remains unlinked to any articulated specific standard of living,
much less a "decent" one. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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for, the 'erosion' of social policies (e.g.,... labor policy)." 35
Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of human
rights, where there is a conviction that human dignity and
sustenance cannot be sacrificed to sovereign agendas or to
corporate bottom lines.
5. The Labor Standard as a Human Right
Various human rights documents include broad statements
supporting fair wage and labor conditions standards. In 1945,
United Nations member States committed themselves to "pro-
moting higher standards of living, full employment, and condi-
tions of economic and social progress and
development....""'3 In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 7 This
Declaration states that [elveryone has the right to work, to
free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of
work, and to protection against unemployment."'38 It further
provides that all workers have a right to "just and favourable
remuneration ensuring... an existence worthy of human
dignity," a right to form and join trade unions, and a right to a
"reasonable limitation of working hours." 39
These principles have been reiterated in subsequent inter-
national covenants.'40 The International Covenant on Eco-
135. Watson, supra note 9, at 1246.
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(a). Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter additionally
establishes the overall goal of "achiev[ing] international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian charac-
ter. . . ." Id. art. 1, para. 3.
137. UDHR, supra note 15.
138. Id. art. 23, para. 1.
139. Id. art. 23, paras. 3-4, art. 24.
140. Regional convents have also addressed the issue. See, e.g., EUROPEAN SO-
CIAL CHARTER, as reuised May 3, 1996, arts. 2-4, 36 IL.M. 31, 34, 35-36 (1997)
(addressing "just conditions of work", the "right to safe and healthy working condi-
tions," and establishing a right "te remuneration such as will give [workers] and
their families a decent standard of living"); Association of Southeast Asian Nations:
Agreements and Statements from the Third Summit, Dec. 15, 1987, para. 48, 27
I.L.M. 596, 608 (1988) (cooperation sought among the ASEAN nations to seek
continuous improvements in "the level of income, the quality of life and the envi-
ronment" by achieving sustainable development); Organization of American States,
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, art. 7(a), 28 I.L.M. 156, 163
(1989) (calling for remuneration guaranteeing a minimum of "dignified and decent
living conditions . . . and fair and equal wages. . . ."); Banjul Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art. 15, O.A.U. Doc.
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nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) provides that State
parties recognize the universal right to favorable work condi-
tions including "fair wages;" a "decent living" for self and fami-
ly; "[slafe and healthy working conditions;" and "reasonable
limitation of working hours."' Moreover, the State parties'
commitment to recognize and ensure the right "to an adequate
standard of living" is reiterated throughout the ESCR.4 2 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
prohibits "forced or compulsory labour,"43 and protects the
"freedom of association.., including the right to form and join
trade unions."' The inclusion of wage and condition rights
within the ESCR is significant in that many nations associate
that Covenant with the notion of "positive" duties,145 which
has led to lesser State adherence than that ascribed to the
ICCPR.
The concept of a fair labor standard as a human right is
not questioned. It is noted, however, that those capable of
directly implementing the standard and recognizing the
right-employers and managers-are not directly subject to the
obligation created. 14 It is regrettable that State enforcement
is required for the realization of the rights and that issues of
sovereignty impair accountability. 47
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (granting every individual the "right
to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions [and to] receive equal pay for
equal work.").
141. ESCR, supra note 15, art. 7(a), (b), (d).
142. Id. art. 11, para. 1.
143. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 8(3).
144. Id. art. 22.
145. One author sees the "positive" right as "demanding more than forbearance
from those upon whom the righVs correlative duties fall." THOMAS DONALDSON,
THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 68 (1989). Due to the "welfare rights"
established under both the UDHR and the ESCR, many nations have balked at
signing these instruments, "arguing that no one can have a right to a specific
supply of an economic good." Id. at 69.
146. International labor standards-whether framed as general human rights or
as specific obligations established by the ILO-operate solely between States be-
cause they are promulgated in multilateral State treaties. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2.1(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (1969) (defining treaties as written agreements between States)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Some commentators argue, however, that transna-
tional market actors should recognize certain basic human rights within their
business operations. See, e.g., Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 111-17. For
an extensive analysis of the degree to which corporations are bound to effectuate
international human rights, see DONALDSON, supra note 145.
147. See Dateline: Toy Story (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 17, 1996) (tran-
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It is not suggested that human rights efforts regarding
labor regulation should be abandoned. Yet, aside from the
argument here regarding law formation, the proximity between
the enforcer and the beneficiary of the rights argues for paral-
lel implementation by market actors vis-A-vis their employees.
6. The Status of Existing Labor Standards in
International Law
Virtually all multilateral forums addressing labor stan-
dards, whether the ILO or various human rights bodies, refer
to the concept of a "decent standard of living." 4 The problem
lies in supplying the concept with substance within the various
environments in which the principle is applied. Moreover,
there is a dynamic quality to the principle as applied to indi-
vidual workers; while it may initially address basic needs, in
its evolved state the principle refers as well to educational and
cultural factors.'49
In 1977, the European Social Charter's Committee of Ex-
perts (ESC Committee) attempted to define the "decent stan-
dard of living" as a concept that:
must take account of the fundamental social, economic and
cultural needs of workers and their families in relation to the
stage of development reached by the society in which they
live; furthermore this concept must also.., be judged in the
light of the economic and social situation in the country
script on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (covering substan-
dard wages, child labor and poor working conditions existing in the operations of
U.S. toy companies' foreign contractors and observing that the companies relied on
host State law as a defense). With growing media coverage, however, it is unclear
how much longer this "defense" will work. A review of the NEXIS databank re-
veals at least 10 major newspapers covering the "sweatshop" issue in December of
1996. Some commentators point out that it is global business that implicitly and
explicitly forces governments in need of foreign contracts to lower their legal labor
standards. See, e.g., BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 16-17. Thus, it is
questionable, at best, for businesses, when held accountable for substandard labor
practices, to then hide behind those legal standards they fostered. Such
.scapegoating" leaves accountability to the States enacting such laws, or not en-
forcing such laws; States which are, after all, only exercising their sovereign pre-
rogatives in establishing national labor standards.
148. BErrEN, supra note 41, at 212-15.
149. See id. at 212 (referring to studies conducted by the European Social
Charter's Committee of Experts regarding Article 4 of the Charter, which
"recognises the right of workers 'to a remuneration such as will give them and
their families a decent standard of living.")
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which is being considered.15
The ESC Committee also defined a "representative wage" as
the wage that is paid to the majority of workers "in a given
country at a given time,"' and stated that a wage excessive-
ly lower than that wage was substandard.'52 One problem
with this formulation is that it does not address occupational
differences. Accordingly, the ESC Committee set a "decency
threshold," at sixty-eight percent of the national average
wage.' On an international level, however, this method can
be used only for States having "comparable socio-economic
structures," and even then other factors such as governmental
benefits and subsidies must be considered." This method
also requires a State's willingness to provide sufficient data to
a central body in order for a threshold in common with other
States to be determined.' 5 This willingness may not exist
outside of a regional structure such as the European Un-
ion. 15
6
The ILO, forming its own committee of experts (ILO Com-
mittee), has distinguished minimum wages, which are estab-
lished by national law, from the notion of minimum income, a
broader term embracing minimum living conditions."7 The
distinction is helpful when examining State action because,
while a State addresses issues of poverty in general through its
150. BETTEN, supra note 41, at 213.
151. BETrEN, supra note 41, at 213.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 214.
155. See id.
156. Trachtman calls the European Union (EU) both a model and a catalyst for
the paradigm shift discussed in Part I of this paper. See Trachtman, supra note 1,
at 37. In arguing for a broader constituency within the WTO framework, Shell
also references the EU, taking note of the fact that the EU has evolved from "a
cooperative steel and coal arrangement in the 1950s into the wideranging social
and economic entity of today. . . ." Shell, supra note 28, at 370. Others disagree
with the use of the EU as a model for evolving institutionalism, as it is a unique
law-making body consisting of States sharing a "commonality of values, experienc-
es, and perspectives." Nichols, supra note 21, at 322. For a survey of the EU's
development from a limited sectoral trade regime to a comprehensive constitutional
framework, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European
Communities: What "Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational
Employers, 11 Nw. J. INTIL L. & BUS. 564, 574-84 (1991).
157. See BETrE=, supra note 41, at 215-16.
323
BROOK. J. INTL L.
minimum income policy, minimum wages are but one factor in
that policy.'58 As formulated by the ILO Committee, a mini-
mum wage is both remuneration for worker services provid-
ed-which must ensure the worker's and her family's subsis-
tence-and a "production cost and component of general con-
sumer expenditure."'59
Formulating the minimum wage as both remuneration and
a production cost is perhaps stating the obvious for market
actors. Yet as demonstrated above, for States attempting con-
sensus within the multilateral framework, this type of formu-
lation alternately provides the threshold of negotiation, the
sovereign boundaries of discussion, and the political nemesis of
effective action.
B. The Attenuation between the Standard and the Market:
State Implementation and Enforcement
While issues of sovereign concern and control pervade the
multilateral process as it exists within international law's
present construct, it is at the level of implementation and
enforcement where a convergence of public and private motiva-
tion informs sovereign will, attenuating the relation between
standard and practice. The ILO labor standards and labor-
related human rights that are found in the multilateral agree-
ments discussed throughout this Note reveal that many States
are willing to formally recognize that decent wages and safe
working conditions are of international concern. But many of
those States which formally obligate themselves to labor stan-
dards do not, in practice, live up to their commitments. 6 '
158. See BErEN, supra note 41, at 217. The distinction is useful in under-
standing the Industry effort urged here, see discussion supra Part H, which ap-
plies solely to wages and working conditions. It does not seek to expand Industry
efforts to address minimum income policy in general. Not only would such an
effort be unwelcomed by market actors, governments would likely perceive such
unilateral efforts as offensive at best, and overreaching at worst.
159. BETrEN, supra note 41, at 217.
160. The reasons for this noncompliance are founded not only in internal State
politics, but are increasingly impacted by capital demands. Another reason for
State noncompliance with labor laws is that many States base their investigations
into employer noncompliance largely on worker complaints; for example, 80% of
U.S. workplace inspections are initiated by workers' complaints. See Gideon Yaniv,
Complaining About Noncompliance with the Minimum Wage Law, 14 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 351 n.1 (1994) (providing an economic analysis regarding the ineffective-
ness of this approach).
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While both international law and the ILO require States
that ratify ILO Conventions to conform their national laws to
those conventions,' 6 ' the internal constitutional issues and
the lack of reciprocity between States has hindered implemen-
tation overall.
Many ILO convention provisions are not "self-execut-
ing,"'62 thus requiring national implementation. Even where
a State's constitution provides for "automatic incorpora-
tion,"16 such States have either been reluctant to ratify ILO
conventions,164 or have insisted that automatic incorporation
alone is sufficient evidence of national compliance--despite the
fact that the State's positive law and enforcement practices
conflict with the convention at issue." Finally, where an
ILO labor provision is considered self-executing, questions of
its rank within federal legal systems arise. 6 In many States,
if a convention norm conflicts with earlier law, the convention
norm may clearly supersede that law in theory. But lack of
public dissemination of the superseding norm may prevent its
effective application in the workplace.6 7 Whether a conflict-
ing ILO provision will prevail over subsequent national law
depends on the individual operation of law within a given
State.6 1 Where a conflict is evident, the ILO's supervisory
body will point out resulting discrepancies to the States, which
Furthermore, there are many States that have not signed on to labor trea-
ties, or have opted out as lesser developed economies unable to support the stan-
dards required.
161. See LEARY, supra note 65, at 10. For much of the ILO's history, there was
debate as to whether ILO conventions create interstate obligations or whether the
ratifying State simply owed a duty to the ILO institution only. See id. at 12. The
issue was apparently settled during the drafting of Article 5 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties in 1968, where it was "assumed that ILO conven-
tions were within the scope" of the law of treaties. Id. at 12, 16 n.28.
162. See supra note 72.
163. See, e.g., LEARY, supra note 65, at 25-26 (noting Mexico's constitutional
framework and its practices regarding ILO implementation). 1
164. For instance, Switzerland, which has ratified relatively few ILO conven-
tions in comparison to other Western European countries, announced in 1969 that
ILO conventions would be ratified only when there is pre-existing national legisla-
tion substantially supporting the standards contained in the convention. See
LEARY, supra note 65, at 30-31.
165. See id. at 25-29 (surveying the issue in connection with Mexico, Columbia,
Guatemala and Argentina).
166. See generally id. at 116-36.
167. See id. at 125.
168. See id. at 127-32.
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often are slow to respond for internal political reasons."'
Moreover, States have traditionally viewed other States'
internal labor practices as having no reciprocal impact, and
thus have not generally sought institutional enforcement of
ILO standards.170 Thus, while conflicting national law creates
an international delinquency for the State at issue, if the State
knows it will not be sanctioned for that delinquency on an
international level, internal political pressure will prevail.' 7'
Thus, while international law presently does not suffer
from a lack of words on labor standards, State action is miss-
ing and the resulting economic impact is shrouded in political
motivation and issues of sovereignty. If, however, concerted
market action were taken to support international labor
norms, that action could translate the market dynamic into a
normative function, transforming market action into State
accommodation and practice.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP: THE PRIVATE ACTOR AND MARKET
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
Interstate aspiration does not equate with international
law.' Without States' implementation and enforcement of
169. See id.
170. See generally id. at 17. Although the ILO Constitution provides a mecha-
nism for interstate complaints, it has rarely been used. See id. at 18. This may,
however, change in the future. Note, also, that the ILO Constitution allows indus-
trial associations to make a "representation" that a State is not complying with
assumed convention obligations. ILO Const., supra note 69, art. 24. In the 46
years between 1924 and 1970, only eight such representations were made, but
notably, in the 12-year period between 1970 and 1982, five representations were
submitted. See LEARY, supra note 65, at 18.
171. Besides difficulties with implementation, ILO labor norms suffer from inef-
fective application as well. See generally LEARY, supra note 65, at 137-49. This
problem derives from poor publicity and dissemination of the ILO norm's require-
ments, as well as judicial confusion over which law to apply when confronted with
an ILO provision and a conflicting national law. See id. at 139. Beyond confusion,
however, national judges are sometimes reluctant to directly apply treaties for
both technical and political reasons. Id. at 163-64.
172. Going beyond the threshold of general normative prescriptions (in this
case, a market norm defying unfair labor practices) and into the realm of "law" is
essential to the universal legitimacy of the fair labor standard.
[D]omestic and international experience demonstrates that a legal system
which lacks more or less clear criteria separating its content from politi-
cally desirable rules, moral rules or courtesy runs a risk of allowing a
high degree of subjectivity in the ascertainment of the applicable rules of
conduct. If the formal tests of validity delineating law from non-law are
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the labor standard, sovereignty serves only to attenuate the
connection between the standard and the market in which it
must be effected. To bridge that gap either the multilateral
construct must fundamentally change73 or an alignment of
interests between States and the market must be fostered to
the good of all. 74 As it is, the attenuation between public law
and private result increasingly undercuts political acceptance
of global market practice, as well as the legitimacy of both the
words and the force of international labor law.
To discuss an alignment of interests between the State
and the market outside of economic gain is not conjecture,
given current global relations. The shifting of priorities and the
expansion of opportunities present in the global market do not
affect States alone, for "an order is ensconced in widening
economic discrepancies among its actors, the pressures for
change and a new order are likely to be extensive and unremit-
ting."75 Although the following analysis necessarily address-
es specific examples and issues arising within international
market -operations, it is underscored by the stance that, just as
the notion of State sovereignty is evolving, so is the role of the
market actor in terms of its impact and accountability. 6 The
absent or are not sufficiently clear, the subjects of law, law-applying
institutions and commentators will tend to invoke in support of their
positions the most different rules allegedly constituting 'law.' The inevi-
table result of such a trend will be a general decline in the authority
and normative power of the law. The law will lose much of its quality as
a body of rules having a special binding character, which is lacking in all
other social norms.
DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 16-17. Arguably, the current state of the internation-
al labor standard is one "experience" that evinces this dynamic.
173. See discussion supra Part m.
174. This alignment of interests may explain States' greater willingness to
subject themselves to affirmative international trade regulation. See discussion
supra Part I. Yet, as this paper argues, the same alignment is possible in the
labor context, for reasons of both political and economic stability for both nations
and market actors.
175. Rosenau, supra note 6, at 21.
176. In the languages of neoclassical economics and international relations,
State interests have traditionally been viewed from the perspective either of "liber-
alism" or "realism." See Cohen, supra note 48, at 272-74. Liberalism posits that
States are concerned "only about the absolute gains from trade and indifferent to
the gains achieved by others." Id at 274. Realism, on the other hand, "suggests
that every state . . . valu[es] relative gains (positional advantage) above all." Id.
Both stances "can be assumed to be in constant competition for the minds and
hearts of policymakers." Id. In essence, it is argued here that the same competing
objectives exist in the global marketplace and, to operate in that market, a market
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impact, as addressed herein, is normative; the accountability is
both political and economic.
A. The Political and Economic Accountability of the Global
Market Actor
Global business operations expose a market actor to multi-
ple accountabilities including political accountability to the
home and host State populations, as well as an increasingly
prevalent mix of the two. Additionally, economic and legal
demands from governments on both domestic and international
fronts will intensify as global business' impact grows. The
Initiative implicates all of these accountabilities, each of which
presents a challenge to normative action.
The challenges presented in transforming a market norm
into international practice are, admittedly, large and complex.
Yet, if the Industry commits to market implementation and
enforcement"7 of labor standards, particularly by coordinated
effort, it will be proactively shaping the norm's creation and
setting it in motion within the market. The Industry vill thus
have a voice in the substance of international law, rather than
passively reacting to State rule.
1. What are the costs?
The primary challenge to the Industry's implementation of
fair labor standards involves cost concerns, which raises ques-
tions regarding the Industry's willingness to implement fair
standards. Yet, the choice to implement the standards can be a
component of a long-term Industry policy to promote both a
stable host market and the stability of its own market position
within the host market, the home market and, with consensus,
globally. Thus, costs cannot be the sole consideration; price
cannot be the sum total of the Industry's policy."'8
actor must encompass both objectives within its business policy and practice. More-
over, the objectives-at least in relation to labor standards--are not necessarily
competing. Ultimately, a market actor's "absolute gain" will depend upon its posi-
tional advantage, and, it is argued that the actor's labor practices will directly
impact that advantage.
177. See discussion supra Part H.
178. By limiting its vision to cost concerns, global industry exposes itself to
intensified regulation, as governmental policy implementation often "rests on mar-
ket shortcoming caused by myopia and the absence of markets by which future
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Why should the Industry pay higher wages when host
State law does not compel it? Traditional wage policy argues
against increases because they impact the bottom line and may
impair future expansion."9 Yet, a narrow vision of the bot-
tom line will likely impair an industry's ability to meet the
expanding demands of a global constituency. •
It is not suggested that the Industry implement the premi-
um wage acceptable by the host State; some economists ac-
knowledge that there is a plateau between a country's estab-
lished minimum wage and its premium wage, that can be
reached by many, if not all, foreign producers without losing a
still sizeable profit margin.80 Further, given the costs of not
addressing substandard foreign wages, be they political costs
at home or stability costs abroad, myopic emphasis on cost
alone can create losses far greater than the sacrificed profit
portion discussed here. 8'
The core issue, as with any labor standard, is whether the
Industry can accommodate paying higher wages.8 2 Yet, it
cannot be ignored that the very question raises political con-
and present generations can trade with each other." J. David Richardson, The
Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy, 44 INTL ORG. 107, 117 n.32 (1990)
(book review).
179. See Rafael Albuquerque, Minimum Wage Administration in Latin America,
6 COMP. LAB. L. 57, 57 (1984).
180. See Sue A. Fauber, Minimum Wage Legislation in Developing Countries:
Zimbabwe-A Case in Point, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 385, 392 (1981) (noting
that "[blecause profit can provide a cushion against unemployment and a rise in
productivity can compensate for higher labor costs, there is a narrow range within
which such wage increases are economically sound.").
181. At the U.S. Department of Labor's prodding, investment community lead-
ers recently participated in a press roundtable, announcing their second "Call to
Action" for the eradication of sweatshops. Labor Secretary, Investment Leaders to
Hold Roundtable on Sweatshops, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 19, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13912971. These investment community leaders--called the "Socially Responsi-
ble Investment Community"-represent a market of $639 billion in capital invest-
ment, and their efforts "prove that looking after the bottom line does not mean
looking toward the bottom." Labor Secretary Herman Announces Second Sweatshop
Call to Action by Socially Responsible Investment Community, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13913005 (quoting Secretary of Labor Alexis
M. Herman).
182. The employer's ability to pay, "that is, their capacity to accommodate
higher labor costs," is among the criteria examined by governmental agencies when
making wage policy. See Albuquerque, supra note 179, at 60 (discussing Latin
American legislative methods). Here, it is assumed that foreign producers would
externalize costs by building the higher wage into their contract price with the
Industry.
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cerns, given public awareness of the tremendous profit margins
for those businesses producing and subcontracting abroad.1"
2. The Political Dimension
Just as it is increasingly difficult to segregate domestic
law and policy from international relations, grassroots political
action has, as well, become global." While the political dy-
namic spurring the Initiative can be traced to domestic agita-
tion, the fact that U.S. citizens are demanding action on behalf
of foreign workers" reveals a new constituency-and type of
183. For instance, one statistic involves the fact that Nike's entire 1992 payroll
for its Indonesian factories was less than the cost of Michael Jordan's sponsorship
fee of reportedly $20 million. See Richard J. Barnet & John Cavanagh, Just Undo
It: Nike's Exploited Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, §3, at 11. The shoes sold
by Nike at that time cost $5.60 per pair to produce, but sold in the United States
for $45 to $80 a pair. Id.
Additional factors fuelling the political fire are the increasing international
identity of business, and the perceived and real national disloyalty of international
business judgment, as well as the growth of global corporate wealth. See BRECHER
& COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 17-18 ("[t]hree hundred companies now own an
estimated one-quarter of the productive assets of the world. Of the top 100 econo-
mies in the world, 47 are corporations-each with more wealth than 130 coun-
tries.").
184. One scholar notes that "domestic values can be maximized through inter-
national action. In this sense, all politics is domestic, at least in its origins. In-
creasingly often, however, it is necessary to enter the market of international rela-
tions to maximize domestic values, such as wealth, employment, and environmen-
tal protection." Trachtman, supra note 1, at 51.
Examples of grassroots political response to market labor practices in-
creasingly abound. For instance, religious and labor organizations recently spon-
sored a "Day of Conscience" on October 4, 1997 in protest of child labor and
sweatshop practices. See Editorial, No Sweatshops, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1997,
at A16, available in 1997 WL 6269735. Other examples include Duke University's
recent steps to disassociate its name from sweatshop labor by requiring licensees
of its logo to provide disclosure of its labor practices, see Dan Kane, Duke to Push
Licensees to Shun Workshops, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 3, 1997, at
Al available in 1997 WL 7860470, and attacks by school faculty against the Uni-
versity of North Carolina for signing a contract with Nike who has been accused
of using sweatshop labor abroad. See Jane Stancill, Hooker Defends Nike, Calls
Issue 'Very Complicated', NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 13, 1997, at B3,
available in 1997 WL 7852792. This sort of line drawing has been spawned by the
formation of at least 30 different student chapters across the nation calling them-
selves "Students Against Sweatshops." See Kane supra.
185. A telling example is that of the worker-to-worker exchanges that have
taken place between American workers in a Ford truck plant in St. Paul, Minne-
sota and the Ford Workers Negotiating Committee in Cuautitlin, Mexico. See
BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 154-56. In the wake of a Ford workers'
strike in Mexico (where nine workers were shot, one fatally), the American and
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consumer-that global business must face. By involving itself
in the Initiative, the Industry has done just that, but it must
recognize that merely cosmetic responses'86 will simply pro-
long ongoing confrontations between business objectives and
public concern.
Just as governments and global business no longer view
territorial and global objectives as mutually exclusive, individ-
uals too, both singularly and collectively, are recognizing such
interdependency and transborder accountabilities.'87 No lon-
ger is "citizenship in a globalizing world.., the same as citi-
zenship in a world that venerated the territorial principle." s
With the advancement of global communications, people
throughout the world are developing varying levels of "analytic
competence,"'89 and are using that competence to serve self-
interests.' Moreover, as the interrelatedness of the world's
people is brought to light-either through environmental or
economic common concern---"self-interest" may expand to in-
clude the interests of others, near and far, who increasingly
share common experience.' 91
Mexican Ford workers agreed "to improve labor's international network for commu-
nication and mutual support." Id. at 155 (quoting an article written by members
of the Negotiating Committee). The stated goal of the international effort was to
push for upward levelling of Mexican conditions. The effort brought about long-
lasting links between the two plants and has been followed in other industries
worldwide. See id. at 155-56.
186. See, e.g., Arthur Friedman, Shaking the Sweat Shop Stigma (Apparel In-
dustry Public Relations Efforts), WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Jan. 7, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8143259 (noting that the Industry's largest trade group, the AAMA, is
mounting "an aggressive campaign to fight the bad press and promote a positive
image," consisting of the "grooming of spokespersons," "developing a long-term
strategy that will collect, disseminate and promote the Industrys 'good news'," and
lobbying in support of strong U.S. labor laws.). The article does not mention for-
eign practices.
187. See Rosenau, supra note 26, at 280-85 (examining this dynamic through
the lens of global and the territorial principles, noting their interdependence as
citizens, organizations and governments seek out influence in both spheres).
188. Id. at 287.
189. See Rosenau, supra note 6, at 22 (arguing that this competence-that is,
peoples' growing capacity to discern the inappropriateness of global arrange-
ments--informs peoples' perception of global business operations and its impact on
their lives and the world in which they live).
190. See Rosenau, supra note 6, at 21-22. Rosenau argues that while the point
can be overstated-in that citizen impact on macro policy is often blunted by ha-
bituation, id. at 274-citizens are nevertheless increasingly aware of their own
leverage and ability to tip the balance from one sphere of influence to another. Id.
at 286.
191. See, e.g., id. at 294. As expressed by one commentator, specifically ad-
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Domestically, a chief political issue for the Industry has
been the avoidance of boycott.192 Prior to the Initiative,
human rights groups pressured the Industry to correct foreign
subcontractors' abuses with the threat of boycott.193 While the
efficacy of boycotts in aiding the workers they seek to help is
arguable,"94 the threat of a boycott is a real one and could
drastically effect the Industry's bottom line. In fact, it is signif-
icant that many apparently connect boycott with cessation of
the boycotted foreign production. Thus, if the market relation
and location of Industry production is of value to the Industry,
the mandate of fair labor standards is valuable as well.195
The political costs of substandard wages and working
dressing international corporate wage policies, it is questionable whether a "race to
the bottom" regarding wages serves anyone's interest. See generally, Harry J. Van
Buren, HI, Competitiveness, Wages, and Corporate Responsibility, BUS. & Socy
REV. (1995), at 63. As Van Buren recognizes, responsible labor practices ensure
the "long-term stability of a society and its economy." Id. at 64.
Indeed, the broad-based effect of a downward wage levelling is being felt
not only across national borders, but also across traditional class lines. Increasing-
ly professional classes are being impacted. See, e.g., BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra
note 26, at 20-21. For instance, software programming operations for over 30 glob-
al corporations has been moved to India from the United States and Western
Europe, and, in other cases, the same type of operations have moved from the
United States to Eastern Europe. Id. Thus, protective alliances are being built
between workers which in the past have been pitted against each other.
192. Indeed, a 1995 survey conducted by Marymount University found that
over seventy-five percent of U.S. consumers would boycott stores selling sweatshop
goods. See Dunne & Burch, supra note 32, at 7. Further, almost 85% of those
surveyed said they would be willingly pay up to $1 more on a $20 item if it car-
ried labelling guaranteeing it was made under humane conditions. Id. Of course,
that $1 may not cover the profit lost if labor standards were forcefully implement-
ed (at least in some markets). However, as argued elsewhere, placing price con-
cerns above all else as a corporate policy is a short-sighted practice, ignorant of
global reality and market potential.
193. Dunne & Burch, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that a boycott called by a
group known as The National Labor Committee forced The Gap to promise action
against its subcontractors for poor work conditions).
194. As one editorialist pointed out in response to the Initiative, "any success-
ful boycott by American consumers is just as likely to close down production and
destroy badly needed jobs as it is to [improve] pay and working conditions .... "
Bert Emke, Editorial, If You Really Care, Support 'Sweatshops', THE COURIER-
JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 1996, at 02D, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
See also Cruel To Be Kind, supra note 32, at 11 (observing that "boycotting a
country that falls short of international standards can only aggravate unemploy-
ment.").
195. The traditional business tenet that "social policy and corporate practice
occupy distinct spheres-and that a rigid separation [of the two] should be pre-
served" is no longer viable, and is rarely pressed by business spokespersons.
Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 97.
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conditions are not limited to domestic agitation. The political
consequences within a host State are not tangential, and re-
sulting unrest can lead to an excessively high cost of doing
business." Political scientists recognize that "economic poli-
cy preferences abroad" can have a "political and institutional
basis at home."'97 Thus, market actors operating on a global
level cannot ignore their social and political effect on the host
population, as it may have both immediate economic repercus-
sions and future strategic backlash.'
3. Host Government Concerns
While market-implemented labor standards are argued to
be of benefit to all, one cannot be simplistic in approaching
foreign governments' concerns regarding wage levels. Any wage
paid within a given structure has a political dimension.'99
Additionally, should market-implemented labor standards
create a higher threshold for labor costs for entering foreign
196. See id. at 97 (discussing the political unrest prevalent in Latin America
during the 1970s and early 1980s as evidence of the correlation between offensive
social policies and investment risk). Another example is Korea's experience of ma-
jor social upheaval in the 1970s, that partially derived from the dissatisfaction of
workers who had fed Korea's economic growth without reaping its benefits. See
Cummings, supra note 41, at 36-37.
197. Cohen, supra note 48, at 268.
198. Indeed, newly industrialized countries that in the late 1980s and early
1990s experienced economic booms largely based on cheap labor and low produc-
tion costs, are beginning to feel the pinch as market actors move to cheaper
shores. See BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note 26, at 24. This migration has led to
a downward spiral as countries that have lowered wages and public spending to
become more competitive, now find themselves faced with stagnation and recession.
As workers have less to spend in markets that are left behind by business, their
nations simply attempt to lower costs even more to attract other business. In the
meantime, national debt is accumulated, and local investment foregone. See id. at
25. This dynamic parallels the "small market" analysis explored, infra at notes
217-22 and accompanying text. Eventually this dynamic will result in political
tension, both within populations and between governments.
199. On a governmental level, "[m]inimum wage fixing is most often viewed as
being essentially a matter of striking a balance between social gains and economic
costs." Brian Bercusson, Minimum Wage Objectives and Standards, 6 ComP. LAB.
L. 67, 75 (1984) (quoting G. STARR, MINIMUM WAGE FIXING 115 (1981)). Because
social gains (and perhaps corresponding losses between groups) implicate the dis-
tribution of total wealth, social politics and contention may result from wage ad-
justments. Because of the economic costs, other industrial and business sectors
may view such adjustments adversely, and use their own political voices in re-
sponse. Referred to as an issue of "acceptability," these political dynamics must be
addressed. See id at 74-75.
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investment, a host government may move to block such imple-
mentation."'0
The protection of a country's comparative advantage will
be of paramount importance to the host government.20 ' As
economic integration between States has increased, host gov-
ernments have had to address issues of wealth derived from
foreign business, especially in relation to wealth derived by
other countries.2 This concern is exacerbated because there
is no international "community of interest"--whereby each
transaction and issue presented is independent from oth-
ers-and so no "trade-off' between States is possible.0 ' This
may change as international mechanisms develop to address
communal decision making on a market level. The current
scenario is, however, that market actors must be aware not
only of a host State's internal objectives, but also of its global
priorities regarding market operations.
Moreover, while a host country generally will welcome an
increased level of wages from foreign business, a host country
may simultaneously fear foreign political interference and
economic dominance.2 Furthermore, there is a fear of a
"form of cultural imperialism," vis-a-vis the imposition of
American values on the host culture."5 In the labor context,
this fear may be misguided as it ignores international recogni-
tion of labor standards. The laws of many States support these
international standards, although they may not always be
enforced in practice. Thus, it is not exclusively American val-
ues that are imposed by the implementation of fair labor prac-
tices, especially since such practices take into account the cost
' 200. See Fauber, supra note 180, at 393 (discussing parliamentary debates in
Zimbabwe in the early 1980s where the argument was advanced that any dynamic
which threatens profit in turn threatens foreign investment).
201. There are those who argue, however, that a State's comparative advantage
has become less relevant as corporations have become "global networks." Intracom-
pany trading and large scale global sales have rendered the concept merely a
guise for the manipulation of global resources. BRECHER & COSTELLO, supra note
26, at 68-69. See also, Robert E. Prasch, Reassessing the Theory of Comparative
Advantage, 8 REV. POL. EcON. 37 (1996) (acknowledging the theory's "problematic
assumptions" in the current global context).
202. See generally, JACK N. BEHRMAN & ROBERT E. GROSSE, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENTS: ISSUES AND INSTTUTIONS 28-29 (1990).
203. Id. at 29.
204. BEHRMAN & GROSSE, supra note 202, at 30.
205. Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 102.
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of living and circumstances present in the host State.
Therefore, host governments cannot be expected to support
a market initiative unless two priorities are accepted: the
broadest implementation possible among States, and equitable
treatment to all impacted by the implemented labor standards.
Equity, as used here, is not simply an issue of justice, but also
one of market creation.
4. The Economic Dimension
A country's labor strategy may involve either offering
profit derived from low-wage structures or profit derived from
high productivity. 6 The low-wage strategy downplays work-
ing conditions and labor rights, while the productivity strategy
focuses "on improving quality and production through innova-
tive technology, positive incentive systems, and worker train-
ing and participation."0 7 Although it would seem that the
latter approach would be more beneficial to both the host coun-
try and the foreign producer, developing countries may choose
the low-wage approach as a means of becoming "economically
competitive."0 8 Yet the choice made between short-term gain
and long-term benefit can have ongoing internal market conse-
quences for both the host nation and market actors operating
therein. 9
In exploring the problems involved in capital formation
within underdeveloped economies, Ragnar Nurkse enunciates
the circular dynamic of societal poverty and its impact on mar-
206. See Green, supra note 115, at 500.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 515.
209. This possibility has been explicitly addressed by Latin American and Ca-
ribbean countries, as reflected in a 1990 report of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). See U.N. Economic
Comm'n for Latin America and the Caribbean, Changing Production Patterns with
Social Equity: The Prime Task of Latin American and Caribbean Development in
the 1990s, U.N. Doc. LC/G.1601-P, U.N. Sales No. E.90.II.G.6 (1990). While the
ECLAC acknowledges that reliance on low-wage, labor intensive production may be
necessary for the initial shift to export-led markets, it rejects long-term reliance on
low-wage labor as a mechanism for growth. See Trubek, supra note 103, at 360.
Instead, "ECLAC believes that successful and long-term participation in the global
economy must be based on continuous improvement of product quality and con-
stant absorption of new technology." Id. Furthermore, ECLAC recognizes that
evolving production processes will ultimately lead to the erosion of any competitive
advantage gained by a national economy based on low wages. See id.
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ket size." First, the general productivity level of a domestic
market will determine its size, and, in turn, that productivity
level is largely determined by the market's use of capital.2"
Yet, a smaller market will not attract the capital necessary to
increase productivity.2 Nurkse posits that the ability of a
country's citizens to spend domestically allows them to become
each other's customers; the internal market will then expand
to meet customer need."' But a populace receiving sub-sub-
sistence wages will not have the buying power necessary, nor
be willing, to support new investments in their market.214
Thus, the small domestic market will remain small, and the
poor will remain poor. While market actors, such as foreign
investors or contractors, may counter this dynamic by invest-
ing solely for export,2 5 this limited form of investment keeps
the domestic internal market stagnant.1 Moreover, sole con-
210. See generally, Ragnar Nurkse, Some International Aspects of the Problem
of Economic Development, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 47, 47 (Rljani
Kanth ed., 1994).
According to one scholar, "the most important ingredients of rapid national
growth are:"
(1) technological progress and improved productivity,
(2) expanding industries and trade momentum (at least internally, if
not through export earnings and increased imports),
(3) substantial saving and investment from productive enterprise,
sustained over a long period,
(4) moderate, bearable tax loads with no significant disincentive ef-
fects, and
(5) sufficient sharing in improved prosperity to maintain social morale
and teamwork.
LOVETT, supra note 102, at 36.
211. See Nurkse, supra note 210, at 47.
212. See id.
213. See Nurkse, supra note 210, at 48.
214. See id. at 48. Notably, increased wage levels could lead to an increase in
local trade, which in turn generates a broader domestic market attracting broader
capital investment. Accordingly, industry initiatives to increase wages should be
supported by host governments, for without local demand (buying power), there
will be no incentive for market supply.
215. See id. at 49.
216. An export-led development model "places four critical obstacles in the way
of upward mobility of the world system." Cummings, supra note 41, at 35. First,
lesser-developed countries must find entry into the global market through avenues
other than wage-related comparative advantage. See id. Reliance on low labor costs
alone provides less incentive for the advancement of marketing, technology, and
organization. Second, "limited factor endowments and... small domestic mar-
kets . . . inhibit second-stage industrialization." Id. Third, low-cost labor provides
only a marginal lead for LDCs over those countries that are even poorer, and that
such a lead is easily lost when producers simply move to cheaper shores. See id.
336
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centration on higher exports does not provide the counterbal-
ance of domestic savings which leads to long term growth of a
domestic economy."'
Some governments have attempted to manufacture this
counterbalance through central planning218 or through invest-
ment by public authorities financed by foreign funds.219 Yet,
balanced growth-the interplay between market capital and
domestic spending-is not the sole province of governmental
planning; a spontaneous, balanced growth may be achieved by
market actors "producing spurts of industrial progress."'0
Moreover, in light of price and job dislocations which are lead-
ing to stagnation in the larger import markets, host govern-
ments should welcome market initiatives that increase local
spending power because it is the domestic market in which
ultimate growth for a country's economy lies.
5. The Legal Dimension
For long-term global economic viability, the Industry must
become a proactive player in the shaping of strategic sectoral
The final obstacle is the political nature of the issue, and the responsive protec-
tionism that results. See id.
217. The smaller, underdeveloped domestic market promises little return for
any investor, be it domestic or foreign. This may explain why domestic savings in
LDCs tend to be used unproductively rather than channeled into local business.
See idU at 49. Another factor limiting domestic savings, and thus hampering possi-
ble investment, is the "widespread imitation of American consumption patterns" by
low wage earners in LDCs. See id. at 53. For example, the American standard of
living, exported to LDCs through media and advertising, impacts the spending and
savings pattern of that poorer economy, regardless of the relatively lower income.
See id. at 53-54. The pre-GATT governmental response (which may continue for
non-GATT countries) was to limit imports, particularly of luxury items, in order to
dissuade wasteful consumer spending domestically. See id. at 55. In the face of the
GATT restrictions on such measures, host countries must address the issue differ-
ently. One political solution-and a solution providing long-term benefit for both
the LDC and foreign investors-is the promotion of a viable internal market which
can compete with foreign goods. Thus, higher wages offer common benefits to
investors and host governments, as well as local workers.
218. See id. at 49.
219. Such governmental investment is "autonomous" of market forces. The pri-
vate actor's investment, however, must be induced by market dynamics: i.e., by
high productivity and profit. Id. at 50.
220. See id. at 48-49. Yet, again, it must be emphasized that this paper en-
courages the Industry, indeed all industries, to act strategically in attempting to
create balanced growth, and not to simply react to it should this growth result
from spontaneous market forces.
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trade policy. Rather than merely being reactive constituents to
State regulation,2 21 market actors should negotiate labor
standards from a policy perspective. While American business
has resisted being cast as an agent of governmental policy, the
Industry can avoid imposition of national, as well as eventual
international regulation, thereby building a "win-win" market
environment for itself and for the States in which it produces
by responsibly embracing the policy (governmental or other-
wise) as a business judgment.
By accepting the challenge of market implementation, the
Industry not only exercises political and economic wisdom, but
can avoid national regulation of its practices, as well as inter-
national response to politically and economically damaging
wage differentials.'
If the Industry follows through on its commitments under
the Initiative, and indeed substantiates them legally through
enforced contractual obligations, its response would transcend
its reactive role in the global dynamic. By taking a proactive
stance through the creation and enforcement of concrete mar-
ket standards, the Industry will anticipate and shape State
response to international labor issues, both on the domestic
221. Gittelman argues that even in South Korea, which is considered a free
trade miracle by proponents of neoclassical economics, the key variable in South
Korea's tremendous growth has been replacement of "the free market with state
control" through implementation of strategic sectoral policy. See Michelle
Gittelman, The South Korean Export Miracle: Comparative Advantage or Govern-
ment Creation? Lessons for Latin America, 42 J. INTL AFF. 187, 187-88. Pure free
trade proponents contend, however, that the governmental function in South Korea
has been merely to "reinforced 'natural' market forces." Id. at 190. Either case
buttresses this paper's argument that national legislation will ultimately support
the positive practices of the private market actor, which will in turn receive in-
ternational governmental support. The extension of market-implemented labor
standards into customary international law is the final step, and will be found in
the interplay between this support and already articulated and established interna-
tional labor norms.
222. As one commentator observes,
As more issues that were previously part of the domain reserve are ad-
dressed in the international sphere, international institutions will be
required to replicate some of the functions otherwise performed by do-
mestic institutions. These functions include, most importantly, sensitivity
to the wide range of social issues that need to be integrated in any deci-
sion .... Increasingly, we recognize that the world is interconnected not
only geographically, but also functionally. Thus, it has become necessary
for institutions . . . to be able to address issues such as trade and the
environment in an integrated fashion.
Trachtman, supra note 1, at 57.
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and international planes.
B. The Market Practice as a Market Norm: Past and Present
Given that substandard labor practices are prevalent with-
in the Industry (and within other industries), can it be claimed
that these practices represent normative industry consensus?
The problem with this claim is one of legitimacy-unless one
divorces the international market from the international com-
munity, and from the laborers who fuel that market, a legiti-
mate consensus cannot be claimed to exist. In the final analy-
sis, it is the communal recognition of a norm that gives it legit-
imacy.' As explored above, substandard labor practices are
not explicitly supported by law nor by the Codes of Conduct
generally promulgated by industry. Moreover, the political
agitation that led to the Initiative's creation belies communal
recognition of the legitimacy of current labor practices. Without
articulated support of its practices by the law, the Industry,
and the governments to which the Industry is subject,' can-
not proclaim their legitimacy to laborers and consumers. They
therefore cannot hope for the long-term stability that results
from internalized normative practice.
The ultimate viability of any international norm rests with
its ability to serve the "collective self-interest" of States.'
The same can be said for the market norm; its viability re-
quires that the interests of all involved are served. The differ-
223. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law,
16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1996). Cooter illustrates this proposition by relat-
ing the evolution of land allocation by the Tolai in Papua, New Guinea. While
initially the village's "big man" oversaw land allocation within the village, once a
market for land developed, the villagers recognized that this norm in practice
could work to their detriment. As such, the big man's power was no longer recog-
nized, and a'new norm of communal decision-making was instituted. See id. at
148.
224. Cooter argues that centralized law, that is, legislative regulation, is mis-
placed in a global economy. See Cooter, supra note 223, at 148. Again, this author
argues that this premise can stand only if the global economy is divorced from the
global community; a perspective found unrealistic, and indeed, untenable, both
economically and socially.
225. An effective norm imposes on a State a specific obligation in exchange for
valuable entitlements. The benefit derived from that norm's operation forms an
interweaving of entitlement and duty that ensures that norm's existence. See
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 16-25, excerpted in WORLD
ORDER, supra note 72, at 34-40.
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ence between the statist norm and the market norm is the
immediacy of relation between those who effect the norm; the
difference is between the vertical hurdles of multilateralism
and the horizontal relation of the contract.
Generally speaking, business norms are generated through
the cooperation of a network of market actors, using efficient
practices established in order to fulfill common objectives." 6
In the initial stages of norm formation, market actors
often punish those deviating from articulated norms, although
the punishers may not conform to the norm themselves.227
This is due to a "strain of commitment," created when the
payoff for cooperative normative behavior is less than that
provided by "appropriation" behavior.2" It is only when "prin-
cipled" enforcement of a norm occurs that aggregate coopera-
tion increases, which both levels the cost of conformity and
decreases the cost of enforcement, thereby relieving the strain
of commitment and fueling the norm's wider acceptance.229
A powerful example of principled enforcement within the
market is the operation of the "Sullivan Principles," which are
credited by many as having had normative force in ending
apartheid in South Africa."0 In 1977, businesses operating in
South Africa voluntarily adopted the Sullivan Principles, which
were later codified in U.S. legislation as conditions to govern-
mental export assistance for employers of a certain size. 1
Supporters of the Sullivan Principles credit them with the
achievement of equal pay for equal work, nondiscriminatory
medical benefits and pensions, and the increased managerial
presence of non-white South Africans due to business-funded
226. See Cooter, supra note 223, at 150 (discussing the "agency game" theory,
where, in long-term relations, the incentive for cooperation is the "pay-off" result-
ing from the cooperation: continued, efficient operation benefitting those involved).
227. See id. at 154. Cooter frames cooperation in terms of "adventitious" con-
formity, where an actor's conforming behavior rests solely on the objective benefit
derived therefrom, as opposed to "principled" conformity, which is based on the
internalization of a norm's premise. See id. at 154-55.
228. See id. at 155 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).
229. See Cooter, supra note 223, at 155, 157. This is particularly true when
entities invested in the norm recognize its benefits to their "reputation": "The
possibility of principled enforcement can be captured in the agency game by intro-
ducing reputation, which supplements repetition in promoting cooperation." Id. at
155-56.
230. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 83 n.45.
231. See id. (discussing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 § 207(a),
22 U.S.C. § 5034(a) (1988)).
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education and training.2 Yet the Sullivan Principles differ
from the current Industry Initiative because the Initiative
directly implicates the Industry's own practices rather than the
abhorrent practices of a foreign State. Both the benefit and the
burden of the Initiative lies squarely with the Industry.
Thus, while principled enforcement benefits others (as
opposed to oneself), 3 an enforced fair labor standard will
benefit all, including the Industry itself, by equalizing labor
costs, decreasing enforcement costs, and increasing the payoff
derived for not only the worker, but for market actors and the
States in which they operate as well.
1. The Market Practice
The Initiative discussed in this Note differs from most
historical examples of transborder market initiatives in that it
directly implicates Industry labor practices and Industry ac-
countability regarding those practices. Past efforts have been
infused with overt interstate coercion rather than market ben-
efit, and have been implemented largely on an ad hoc basis
among isolated market actors. As such, the normative equation
discussed above did not take root, and except in the instance of
the Sullivan Principles, uniform conformity was not achieved.
Prior to the 1996 Initiative certain U.S. businesses insti-
tuted codes of conduct for the operation of their Chinese sub-
sidiaries and contractors." 4 These codes were in turn fol-
232. Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 92. Another example of norm
formation is found in the implementation of the "MacBride Principles," which set
employment standards for firms operating in Northern Ireland, and which are
used by local governments in Ireland to condition operations and investments in
their communities. Id at 83.
The United Nations has also attempted to address corporate conduct on the
international plane in its Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.
Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N.
ESCOR, Org. Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add.1
(1988). This code has yet to be approved, however, due to "a conflict of ideology
and interests." DONALDSON, supra note 145, at 37.
233. Id. For example, while businesses following the Sullivan Principles may
have incidentally benefitted on a political level, the Principles' objectives ran to
black South Africans.
234. These businesses included Levi Strauss & Co., Phillips-Van Heusen, Sears
Roebuck and Co., Timberland Co. and Reebok International Ltd. See Orentlicher &
Gelatt, supra note 40, at 67. In 1990, Reebok International Ltd. vowed it would
not operate under Chinese martial law, and in 1992 adopted a code of conduct
regarding work place conditions in all of its overseas production. See id. Sears,
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lowed by legislative initiatives, which would have requested
companies with significant Chinese presence to make "best
efforts" to contribute to the support of human rights reform in
China. 5 Adherence to the codes would have been essentially
voluntary because noncompliance would not have been penal-
ized; the legislation would have simply required informative
registration with the Secretary of State regarding a parent
company's participation." s While these efforts are not to be
derided, they were flawed in that they cast the market as
merely an agent of sovereign policy, rather than as an indepen-
dent force in the global order.
Similarly, the Initiative can be seen as "back door" imple-
mentation of governmental policy. Yet, because the Initiative
does not explicitly implicate interstate politics, the more apt
perspective is that the Industry is being asked to negotiate
labor standards from a policy perspective. The policy invoked,
however, is not directly attributable to the U.S. government,
but rather derived from global industries' accountability, and
the increased global authority to which its accountability is
incident."
Roebuck and Company announced in 1992 that it would not import the products
of Chinese involuntary or prison labor, and established monitoring procedures to
back up its commitment. Id. Both Levi Strauss and the Timberland Company have
conditioned investment on the host State's recognition of basic human rights, and,
in 1993, both companies followed up on their commitments by removing their
investments and sourcing from the PRC. Id. Finally, as of 1993, Phillips-Van
Heusen (which is also an Initiative participant) "threatened] to terminate orders
from suppliers that violate human rights principles enshrined in its ethical code."
Id
The uniqueness of these corporate efforts is evident when examining the
annual debates regarding the United States' continued recognition of the PRC's
MFN status under the GATT. See id. at 80-81. The U.S. business community has
largely opposed conditioning China's MFN status on its human rights record for
fear that a termination of that status would invoke China's retaliation against
those U.S. businesses operating in or exporting to China. Id. These fears were
evidently warranted as U.S. companies are "regularly threatened with cancellation
of orders or loss of future deals if China loses its preferred Status." Michael
Weisskopf, Backbone of the New China Lobby: U.S. Firms, WASH. PosT, June 14,
1993, at A2. Moreover, the business community has argued that its mere presence
and commercial interaction within Chinese borders "strengthened the pro-demo-
cratic forces in China." Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 81 (citing Letter
from Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade to President Bill Clinton (May 12,
1993), at 1).
235. Id. at 83.
236. See id. at 83-84.
237. There is a strident argument that transnational market actors deserve pri-
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2, The Market Norm
a. The Norm
If the objectives of the Initiative are as reported, it is the
notion of a wage compromise that provides the greatest sup-
port for the argument presented here. That compromise estab-
lishes Industry compliance with host State minimum wage
law, but also encourages a linkage between wages and a decent
standard of living. Thus, if the Initiative is to succeed, the
Industry must commit to market practice explicitly informed
by an international labor standard. But before addressing the
effect of such market action, questions must be asked as to
why and how it should be effected. These questions implicate
the shifting authority within the current world order, and,
thus, the political and economic priorities of the Industry itself.
For the Industry's commitment to be credible, it cannot
merely rely on the established domestic minimum wage in the
host country. First, if such reliance were viable, it is doubtful
whether the Initiative, and the concern surrounding it, ever
would have arisen. Second, both implementation and enforce-
ment of minimum wage standards are difficult to achieve,
particularly in developing countries," s where the need for
economic development may predominate over workers'
needs."s Further, inflation may be a significant consideration
of a government when setting a minimum wage. 4 Finally, if
the deterioration of real wages has reached drastic levels, the
host government under public pressure, will step in to regulate
mary accountability for the degradation of international labor standards, in that:
[the transnationalization of investment has engendered a global chase for
the cheapest labor markets, international investment practices inevitably
drive down wage levels as developing countries compete for foreign in-
vestment. In this setting, it has become increasingly difficult to persuade
governments of developing countries to respect internationally-recognized
labor rights, particularly the right to receive a wage that meets 'basic
human needs' of workers.
Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 100 (citations omitted).
238. See Albuquerque, supra note 179, at 63-66. In the end, "a professed mini-
mum wage policy in the Third World may be nothing but government propaganda
that is not put into practice." Id. at 58.
239. Id. at 60.
240. See id. at 61. The deterioration caused by inflation can render a fixed
wage useless to the long term well-being of a worker. See id. (showing inflation's
drastic corrosive effect on wages in the Dominican Republic over a eight-year
span).
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wages"--a process in which the foreign market actor may
have little say. In sum, relying on a host country's minimum
wage will not likely overcome the political pressures here at
home. By not otherwise effectively addressing substandard
wages and conditions, the Industry exposes itself to govern-
mental action over which it will have no control. 2
To embrace the "decent standard of living" as a market
norm, the Industry must be able to give it substance in the
market. Any contract provision invoking the standard must
have cognizable dimension in order to satisfy market reliance
and supply a basis for enforcement. What is being suggested
here is a "living wage," based on the living standard within the
host environment.
In examining the notion of an Industry wage standard, it
is helpful to look at the debate over whether a wage standard
should be "absolute" (meeting basic needs) or "relative" (as
compared to other pay levels). 3 The standard articulated
within most public norms correlates more closely to the abso-
lute standard: the basic needs of a worker within a certain
population. Yet, because the basic needs of any particular
States' workers will be "relative to the community in which it
is measured;" a fixed standard will be arbitrarily set.' Thus,
in creating a contractual wage obligation that meets basic
needs, the market actor can take one of two approaches: state
a fluid standard and wait for eventual enforcement action to
define it, or state a defined standard in the contract itself.
In defining a contractual standard, the Industry can in-
form its approach by looking at the four traditional criteria
cited in minimum wage creation: (1) worker need;
(2) comparable wages and income; (3) capacity to pay; and
(4) requirements of economic development. 5 Some govern-
ments, in approaching this criteria, simply index the needs of a
241. See id. at 61-62.
242. Although governments may consult with employers in setting minimum
wages (for instance, Mexico has established a National Commission for Minimum
Wage Rates, encompassing both employer and worker representatives). See id. at
64. Given the differing objectives of local employers and foreign producers, such
collaboration may not answer the political and stability needs of foreign market
actors.
243. See id. at 75.
244. Bercusson, supra note 199, at 75.
245. Id.
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common worker and their corresponding costs to arrive at a
fixed wage standard. 6 Other countries determine the cost of
the "market basket"-current prices of goods and services con-
sidered vital to meet workers' needs-as determined by the
government, which generally also controls consumer price
levels. 7 While the Industry may not be able to analyze these
issues as deeply as a governmental entity, awareness of the
components of worker need in any environment should impact
the substance of the standard set, whether it be set by the
Industry itself, or by a court enforcing the standard.
b. The Norm's Enforcement
As with interstate standards, it is the enforcement of the
contractual labor obligation that lends the market standard its
normative force."4 It is also broad enforcement by Industry
members that will equalize labor costs, decrease enforcement
costs, and increase the payoff derived from the norm. Thus,
prior to legislative accommodation of industry labor practices,
the practice and reliance thereon must be established.
Enforcement of a market norm can derive from market
sanctions and/or from arbitration or adjudication. Market sanc-
tion is found in the "tit for tat" of reciprocal benefit obtained
from established practice; in other words, market enforcement
occurs when market actors ensure that the benefit of a bargain
derives from conformity with market norms."4 Some argue
that market enforcement should, as much as possible, supplant
contractual enforcement in order to limit reliance on State
246. Mexico, for instance, has concluded that the "minimum wage must be
equal to the income required to meet the cost of lodging, support of the home,
food, clothing, transportation, entertainment, sports activities, vocational school
attendance, use of libraries and other centers of culture, and education for the
children." Alburquerque, supra note 179, at 59 (citing Federal Labor Law of Mexi-
co, Art. 652).
247. See id. at 59-60.
248. See discussion supra Part III.B.
249. See Cooter, supra note 223, at 150-51. As articulated by Cooter, a regu-
larity of practice "results from inclination," while a norm "imposes an obligation."
Id. at 149. While economists largely ignore the difference between the two in mar-
ket studies, see id., Cooter (and the author-although to different ends) argues
that the distinction can be ignored only at the peril of law's legitimacy. Cooter
appears to argue that, absent reference to "the sense of obligation" fueling a norm,
its viability cannot be measured by the law supporting it. Id.
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involvement in market operationsY Yet, most also recognize
that the threat of legal enforcement more fully substantiates
the norm, and that actual enforcement lends credence to
the threat. 2 For this reason, in conjunction with the fact
that the contract legitimizes market relations, the Industry
must contractually support and enforce its decent wage and
labor conditions standard. Not only will such enforcement
serve to crystalize the standards into norms, but it will, with
broad enforcement among Industry members, serve to trans-
form the norm into law.
V. STATE IMPLEMENTATION: LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR
MARKET ACTION
As explored in Parts I and II of this Note, international
law does not operate in a vacuum, but in its current operation,
its universe largely consists of States. As such, despite the fact
that harmonization of laws is increasingly being sought, 3
international law addresses the private relation as a jurisdic-
tional issue.' While international economic law, which en-
compasses "a conglomerate of private law... , state law and
public international law," 5 has the potential to provide effec-
tive labor standards, "at present [it does not establish] a full
set of rationales" for such regulation; according to Trachtman,
"a full set of rationales ... must first be articulated domes-
tically. " 25
Thus, while national boundaries are becoming less defini-
tive of public and private power, they still delineate the alloca-
tion of State power and the contexts in which that power is
functionally exercised. 7 Yet, as Trachtman has stated, inter-
250. See Cooter, supra note 223, at 165.
251. See id. at 159-60.
252. See id. at 160.
253. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods [hereinafter CISGI, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980). The CISG attempts "comprehensive codification"
of multilateral rules governing international contracts in support of efficiency and
standardization within international sales transactions. Peter Winship, Formation
of International Sales Contracts under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17 INTL LAW.
1, 5 (1983).
254. See Trachtman, supra note 1, at 46.
255. Id. at 49.
256. Id. at 50.
257. Thus, the legal relations of market actors operating globally are shaped
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national economic law can transcend the absolute (and "artifi-
cial") bifurcation of domestic/international rule because eco-
nomic law "does not reject domestic values, it absorbs
them."18 Accepting this premise, however, leaves an unan-
swered question regarding from what practices and mores
those domestic values derive:
Economic competition changes products and techniques,
which in turn creates new problems of coordination and coop-
eration. Communities of people solve these problems by de-
veloping norms of behavior. Social norms impose obligations
and coordinate expectations. The State raises some social
norms to the level of law.29
The argument here is that domestic values derive, in part,
from accepted market practice, and that while market actors
often harness this dynamic for domestic law purposes, they
must comprehend that the same dynamic increasingly extends
outward into international realms. Thus, if the Industry con-
certedly implements the fair labor standard through market
practice in various contexts, discreet but broadly-placed domes-
tic values could arise; values fueled by market enforcement,
with uniform compliance eventually sought under the law.
Assuming domestic law reflects the values operating within
the society it governs, 6° it can equally be assumed that the
fundamentally by conflicts of law analysis, which, at base, deals with "the alloca-
tion of public [namely, State] power." Id. at 40.
258. Id. at 51. As such, those operating internationally must not only "think
globally and act locally,' [but] must also think locally and act globally" Id.
259. Cooter, supra note 223, at 141.
260. This is an assumption that must be accepted if democratic governance is
to be credited with authenticity. Trachtman asserts that the absorption of private
international law into public international law is problematic because the latter
has failed to address public policy issues implicated in private claims and interests
because there is no mechanism "for active legislation and the incorporation of
democratic values in legislation in the international legal sphere." Trachtman,
supra note 1, at 41. While the argument here examines a legal evolution from
private action through State accommodation that leads to international law,
Trachtman instead argues that, because limitations to the doctrine of sovereignty
are less threatening when addressed in the sphere of trade and business regula-
tion, international economic law could lead directly to international legislation on
issues pertaining to global market relations. Id. Yet, history shows that true inter-
state legislative treatment of the international labor standard is problematic, and
labor issues are likely to remain resident in State sovereignty for some time to
come.
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fair labor standard, at its normative stage, will invite domestic
legislative support.26'
Moreover, it can be postulated that, if fair labor standards
are extensively implemented within various domestic regimes,
collective pressure will grow for the norm's implementation on
an interstate basis. 2 ' While that implementation could very
well be sought within the ILO, or from international economic
law forums,2" such a process constricts market action to the
261. The domestic law discussed in this section refers to the host State's law.
The home State's legal response to the fair labor standard abroad cannot, however,
be ignored. Sovereignty generally requires that a host State's domestic law govern
market actions within its borders. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 40, at 103.
However, home State domestic law, particularly that of the United States, increas-
ingly attempts extraterritorial reach. 'Municipal law that regulates transnational
activities between non-State actors, as well as between such actors and State gov-
ernments, occupies a growing area of transnational law." Id at 105. Even before
the Initiative was announced, United States lawmakers proposed legislative sup-
port for fair labor conditions and wages abroad. These efforts, however, face sever-
al barriers from the foreign host State and from private resistance in the home
State. Commenting on Rep. Gephardt's contemplated expansion of the Trade Act,
Watson stated "[there may however be some question as to whether alleged in-
fringements of such [expansion] can be sustained (e.g., are the foreign laws unrea-
sonable, or burden or restriction on U.S. Commerce), or whether an action taken
thereunder might violate the GATT." Watson, supra note 9, at 1246.
Note, however, that when a home State's domestic law contravenes the host
State's law, the host State's law "generally should prevail." Orentlicher & Gelatt,
supra note 40, at 104.
262. Many western countries which presently have committed themselves to
higher labor standards domestically are seeking interstate response to wage differ-
entials. It is assumed that if such commitments were made elsewhere due to mar-
ket support, other countries would seek the same response.
263. In this vein, Trachtman states that "economic integration is the leading
motivation for new public international law today, and the most fertile source of
new legislation and constitutionalization in international law." Trachtman, supra
note 1, at 36. For an examination of the historical precursors of current interna-
tional economic law, including law merchant and conflicts analysis, see Paul, supra
note 3, at 609-612. Trachtman states that international legal governance within
the institutional framework encompasses two separate poles: intergovernmentalism
and integration. See Trachtman, supra note 1, at 47-48. In his words,
"[i]ntergovermentalism is simply a method of facilitating action by member states
without binding them in advance to accept action." Id. at 48. In essence, the inter-
governmental institution provides a forum and structure in which States act in
cooperation, or not, based solely on independent sovereign prerogatives. See id.
Integration, on the other hand, "pools" sovereign power, which is then transferred
to a "governance mechanism" which wields that power on the relevant issue. Id.
Trachtman argues that "the low politics of international economic law" are more
conducive to the use of integration, although integration in the economic area
would have spillover effect within interstate cooperation on "high politics" (e.g.,
issues of war and peace, human rights, etc.). Id. It is for this reason that
Trachtman insists that conceptual revision of sovereignty will lie in the interna-
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political realm. This Note, instead, examines the market
norm's potential as a catalyst for customary international law.
VI. STATE ACTION AND STATE CONVICTION: CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The dynamic explored in this Note has been one of market
action and its normative implications; the model examined has
sought the symbiosis of State conviction (extant multilateral
labor standards), private response (the Initiative), and State
accommodation (national legislation and interstate acceptance).
It is the final step in the process, interstate acceptance, that
this section explores.
International law does not contain the hierarchical struc-
ture of law-making found in many national legal systems."'
The International Law Commission has emphasized that "the
pre-eminence of fundamental principles of the international
legal order are determined by their content, not by the process
by which they were created."265 Scholars have long debated
the impact of societal dynamics on the law-making process;
that is, the legal impact of private action which "ultimately
determine[s] the content of the law."66 For the most part,
however, the issue has been relegated to law creation within
national legal systems, 6' the assumption being that State ac-
tion alone impacts international law formation.2" While
many agree that the State is no longer the exclusive constit-
uent of international law, it must be acknowledged that State
action is essential to the process of law creation.269
tional economic law revolution. See id. Because international labor standards can
be framed as both economic and as social/political in nature, where they fall with-
in this construct is an open question.
264. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 7.
265. Id. The term "principles" is used here, as often used elsewhere, to mean
norms which approach universal validity in the international order in the sense
that they substantiate the concept of "general international law". See id. at 8-9.
266. Id. at 5.
267. See id. at 78-79.
268. See id. at 82. Note, however, that actions taken by international organiza-
tion also contribute to customary law formation. See id. at 83. Moreover, decisions
of international tribunals, particular the ICJ, may inform law creation, to the
extent that the decisions impact State practice. See id.
269. It is "the legal policies of states" that influence customary international
law formation. Id. at 87. As such, the present argument does not diverge from the
common view that individual actions do not "constitute a law-creating practice;
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While an analysis covering multilateral consensus, market
action, and then concerted State response seems overextended,
the fact is that the formation of customary international law is
a complex, extended process in itself. It encompasses State
conviction and action derived from multifarious relations and
objectives."' Its formation represents a fluid dynamic ulti-
mately leading to acknowledged State practice on a particular
issue, combined with State recognition that the practice is
required by international law.27 Once formed, however, cus-
tomary law becomes fixed in its application; it does not rely on
State consent, but extends to all States regardless of their
individual stance on the issue. That is, once crystallized, cus-
tomary international law is binding on all States.
While some have argued that customary law is a dynamic
by which already existing law becomes conscious,272 most ac-
knowledge that customary law is a conscious law-making pro-
cess, as well as an ultimate result.273 The conscious process of
customary law-making is what this Note addresses; yet, by
addressing market practice as the catalyst for customary law's
formation, it diverges from the traditional construct, which
looks solely to the impetus provided by concerted State action.
they are simple facts giving rise to international practice of states." Id. at 84.
However, the present argument does deviate from this view in that it does not
acknowledge such an absolute boundary between the individual and State dynamic.
It also encourages conscious individual action in international law formation, which
can transform individual "facts" (of which States may or may not be cognizant)
into concerted market demands which converge with State concern.
270. In one view, this extended process is characterized as the "gradual hard-
ening of practice into law." MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND TREATIES 77 at 29 (1985). A brief summary of Viliger's treatment of a
process expounded by Verdross states a dynamic in which at least three stages of
customary law formation exist: (1) State claims or practices are properly made or
taken for a variety of reasons encompassing politics, self-interest, and comity;
(2) the claims and practices from stage one are reacted to by other States, either
upholding or denouncing them, the result of which is State expectation, and an
eventual reliance and demand for reciprocity, (3) the claims and practices gradual-
ly harden into a general rule, which eventually is looked upon as an emerging
customary norm. As State awareness of the norm broadens, a uniformity of State
conduct develops, which ultimately is perceived as obligatory. Id. % 77 at 29-30.
271. See DANMILENKO, supra note 2, at 76; Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(a), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945).
272. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 77-78. This view is influenced by natural
law theory, treating customary law's creation as "unconscious or unintentional law-
making." Id. at 78.
273. See id. at 77. Whether or not they declare their motivations, States are
well aware that their actions may have law-making force. See id. at 79.
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Yet, at this point, the analysis must rebound into the tradition-
al construct, recognizing that State action and conviction will
be the ultimate vehicle of customary labor law formation.
A. The Nature of Customary International Law
Customary law is composed of evidence of State conviction
that an interstate obligation exists, and State action meets
that obligation.274 Delineating the two can be a difficult un-
dertaking. As defined by one scholar, State practice consists of
"any act, articulation or other behavior of a State as long as
the behavior in question discloses the State's conscious atti-
tude with respect to-its recognition of-a customary rule."275
A close examination of this definition finds a blurred boundary
between action and evidence of conviction. This Note attempts
to address this difficulty by distinguishing between
multilateralism and enforcement of both national and parallel
international law. It is argued that State conviction will be
found in existing international standards established in multi-
lateral forums. It is the concerted national legislation support-
ing market-initiated expectation and practice, coupled with
enforcement of the legislation, that will constitute State action.
Thus, interstate acceptance of market-established labor
standards contemplates a two-pronged dynamic. The first
prong involves the extant international labor standards found
in the multilateral efforts discussed in Part III above, and
reflected in the market norms implemented by the Industry.
The second prong is national efforts to legally integrate those
norms, as supported by national laws, to develop a uniformity
of standards facilitating global trade.276
274. State practice "crystallize[s] the content of relevant rules of conduct," but
it is State "acceptance as law" that transforms those rules of conduct "into legally
binding norms." Id at 81.
275. VILLIGER, supra note 270, 1 18 at 4 (citations omitted).
276. The arguments put forth for uniformity among national regulatory systems
break down into one of "practicality" and one of "economic efficiency." See Watson,
supra note 9, at 1242. The practicality argument, in brief, speaks to the difficul-
ties of creating integrated production systems if the components of production are
subject, in each State, to different regulatory standards and laws. See id. The
economic efficiency argument calls for the integration of each national system into
a single regulatory system in order to support scale economies and reduce costs.
See id. at 1242-43.
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1. State Conviction on International
Labor Norms as Law
While a treaty is generally defined as a written interna-
tional agreement between States that is governed by interna-
tional law,27 international law recognizes that treaties im-
pact general law formation in two ways. 7 First, a treaty can
serve to codify customary international law as it exists at the
treaty's drafting.Y19 Second, the treaty can provide evidence of
277. Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 2(1)(a). "As a formal matter, gen-
eral multilateral treaties containing rules of general (conventional) law are a
source of international law for the contracting parties-and no one else."
DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 53.
278. Some argue that a multilateral treaty that is limited and specific in scope
must be analogized to a "contract" between States. See DANILENKO, supra note 2,
at 47. Others, however, recognize multilateral treaties as a potential source of
general international law. See id. at 46, 52-53. "If general law is taken to mean
law binding on a great number of states, then it is undisputed that broad multi-
lateral treaties can lead to the creation of general law." Id. at 52.
279. See id. at 47; Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 38, in 8 I.L.M. at
694. The treaty as a codification of customary law is treated with caution in inter-
national tribunals. The general rule is that "a treaty creates law as between the
states which are parties to it." Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
(Ger. v. Pol.) 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 7, at 29. However, the proliferation of
human rights treaties which create State obligations to individuals within its terri-
tories have changed this traditional constraint in response to the increasingly
recognized impact of State action on individuals. This reconstruction does not,
however, impact the traditional notion that a treaty generally does not create
obligations for third States which have not ratified it. Vienna Convention, supra
note 146, art. 34, in 8 I.L.M. at 693. The basis of this rule lies in State sover-
eignty. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 48-49.
McNair argued that treaties can create "objective regimes" such that treaty
norms, without reference to customary law evolution, can be extended to third
States based on the "semi-legislative authority" of the participating States derived
from their particular interest in the treaty's subject matter, and the third State's
acquiescence. See id. at 61. Currently, however, international law does not readily
acknowledge this dynamic. See id. at 62-63. Yet, it is important to note that,
while not without controversy, global interdependency is beginning to give more
weight to the creation of universal State obligations, particularly regarding envi-
ronmental issues falling within "the common heritage of mankind." See, e.g., The
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122
(1982). It must be noted, however, that the force behind this trend may be more
political than legal; its future validity as a form of law-making is subject to shift-
ing political needs. See DANILENKO, supra note 2, at 64-68.
It cannot reasonably be argued that current promulgations of international
labor standards represent codification of pre-existing customary law. As Stated by
the I.C.J., a normative treaty provision must, at the least potentially, "be of a
fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the
basis of a general rule of law." North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.;
F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 72 at 41-42 (Feb. 20). As seen in Part III,
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State conviction as an element of customary law formation."0
It is the second function, the treaty as evidence of State convic-
tion, that is essential to this Note's argument.
Whether the State practice derives from extant legal obli-
gation, or forms a basis for eventual acceptance as law, the
resulting custom has the same force. The multilateral treaty,
however, has created a platform from which State consensus
on legal obligation is often formed prior to any resulting State
practice.28' This staggered dynamic is vital to the argument
here: the private market action has fomented State action
which supports a consensus of State conviction previously
established in multilateral forums2s2But, if States do not observe the extant labor standards
within their domestic law-making and enforcement, those
standards cannot base an argument that customary labor law
exists, regardless of how many promulgations are made on the
subject. "[A] convergence of State positions on the purely ver-
bal level does not suffice to create customary legal prescrip-
tions."' For the "decent" wage and working condition to be
customary law, it must be "based on constant and uniform
practice of states."'
international labor standards have consistently been open-textured in nature in
order to encompass individual sovereign interests. Moreover, uniform State practice
has yet to be achieved, thus the second element of customary law was certainly
absent at drafting.
280. Indeed, the scope of the multilateral forum itself lends increasing credence
to this conclusion. See DANMILENKO, supra note 2, at 79.
281. See id. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, pa-
ra. 52 at 23 (July 25). In that case, the ICJ stated that the subject fishing rights
had "crystallized as customary law. . . arising out of general consensus" evidenced
at the Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. See DANILENKO, supra note
2, at 92.
282. See discussion Part III, supra. It must be noted, however, that the notion
that State consensus on the labor standard has been achieved multilaterally may
be undercut by the opt-out provisions prevalent in ILO Conventions, as well as
the explicit reservations of States in human rights treaties containing labor norms.
Thus, the extant multilateral standards, as presently supported, cannot stand
alone as evidence of the customary status of international labor standards. But, to
blur the line between action and conviction, it is the potential agitation of a broad
collective of States to achieve uniform application of the standards that will but-
tress the conviction element of the customary labor norm.
283. DAMLENKO, supra note 2, at 91.
284. Id. at 75.
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2. State Practice: Implementing and Enforcing
International Labor Norms as Law
Because State practice and State conviction must converge
to create customary law, the relevant State action must gener-
ally be that which manifests the will of the State. Thus, the
organs of a State which can impact law formation are those
which "normally represent states in international affairs."'
However, on a practical level, various State organs are recog-
nized as able to participate in forming a State's legal posi-
tion."s Moreover, the definition of "practice" is generally
moving away from sole recognition of actual State practice, and
now includes "other persuasive manifestations of state legal
policy." 7 Importantly, the International Court of Justice has
specifically recognized that legislative acts initiate and form
State practice," although the Court still looks to actual
State practice as well. The Court's stance implies that en-
forcement of legislation, as well as its enactment, is required to
form the requisite State action. 9
If supportive State practice regarding labor standards is to
represent customary law, existing international law, i.e., estab-
lished labor norms, must determine "the legally relevant mani-
festations of practice" requisite to customary law forma-
tion."' The State practice contemplated in this analysis is
three-fold: (1) the enactment of legislation supporting the mar-
ket-implemented labor norms within a broad representation of
States due to concerted market action;29' (2) each State's en-
285. Id. at 84.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 86-87. This view is supported, in particular, by developing nations
which strive for greater voice in international law creation. See id. at 88.
288. See idU at 85 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32-33 (Feb. 20)).
289. See id. at 91.
290. Id. at 81.
291. Isolated evidence of practice does not suffice to create customary law. See
id. at 94. However, the requisite wide-spread action does not denote universal
action, see id. at 95, and the generality requirement would be fatal to customary
labor norm formation only absent broad-based market implementation.
Because the scope of State practice evincing the norm depends on the
norm's sphere of application, regional custom is possible. The problem with region-
al labor custom is the same as that presented by the current situation: if separate
standards exist from region to region, the incentive to derogate from a given stan-
dard exist in order to maintain competitive advantage with other regions. See
VALTICOS, supra note 86, at 49.
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forcement of that legislation at the market actor's insis-
tence;292 and (3) the resulting interstate agitation for parallel
compliance with ILO and human rights standards.
Thus, if broadly implemented market norms reflecting
established interstate obligation find support in domestic law
based on market enforcement, the market actor can have nor-
mative impact on the international level. Upon the customary
labor norm's formation, the conscious partnership between the
market actor and the State will bear fruit for both: the market
actor has substantiated the norm at play, and both the market
actor and the States will benefit from its uniform application.
CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this Note was born of questions
raised by the Initiative regarding the ability of international
law to address substandard wages and working conditions on a
global basis. Research revealed a microcosm of the global or-
der, with the interests of citizens, business, and States fully
implicated. The economic need of workers, the political convic-
tion of individuals, the market practice of global business, and
State response represent every level of the global constituency,
and the interplay of objectives and policy fueling global change.
But, what was discovered was a clash between the rigid
constructs of sovereignty within traditional international law,
and the effective operation of that law in current global reality.
The issues that arose were the implications of a State's use of
a market actor to achieve a transborder result without sover-
eign line-drawing, the ability and willingness of the market
actor to assume the role of policymaker, and the result of a
conscious partnership between the State and the market in
effecting the operation of international law. While, analytically,
the attempt to synthesize the interests of a generic market
with generic States can lead to simplism, the conclusion
reached is that due to the shifting power of the market and
States, market actors not only can, but do, have normative
impact on international law. The conviction formed, however,
is that in order for international law to sustain its legitimacy,
292. The assumption is that market actors will insist on enforcement in order
to comply with their Initiative commitments, and to avoid the political costs dis-
cussed in Part IV above.
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the market actor must be accountable for that impact, and
must consciously address that accountability through norma-
tive choice.
Global reality gives wide play to private actors, and inter-
national law must reflect and accommodate that reality.
Whether one can accept that the market actor is able to impact
customary international law is not as important as the recogni-
tion that such an analysis is possible given the changing na-
ture of sovereign power and private authority in current inter-
national relations. Whether or not the economists are correct
in saying that market action does not require legislative sanc-
tion is arguable. But it is clear that the law's viability must
contend with the norms it supports. If the Industry's current
practices cannot viably be supported by accepted international
law, for both political and pragmatic reasons, normative stabil-
ity cannot attach to those practices. It is only by adapting
labor practices to those which can be supported by internation-
al law, that long-term market stability-and the efficiency that
entails--can be achieved.
Jennifer L. Johnson
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